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MANDATORY MINIMALISM
Erik Luna ∗ & Paul G. Cassell ∗∗

INTRODUCTION
Lengthy mandatory prison sentences in the federal system are
under heavy fire. The basic critique of these “mandatory minimums” is
well known and becoming more widely accepted: A mandatory
minimum deprives judges of the flexibility to tailor punishment to the
particular facts of the case and can result in an unduly harsh sentence.
In the past, it was perhaps unsurprising to find federal judges—
including Justices Stephen Breyer and Anthony Kennedy, and the late
Chief Justice William Rehnquist 1 —voicing dismay at the excessive
sentences they were required to pronounce and affirm. 2 But the most
∗ Professor of Law and Law Alumni Faculty Fellow, Washington and Lee University School
of Law. Many thanks to Amy Baron-Evans and Troy Booher for thoughtful comments, and to
Katherine Brings for excellent research assistance.
∗ ∗ Ronald N. Boyce Presidential Professor of Criminal Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney
College of Law. This Article is the result of a discussion that began earlier this year. See
Symposium, Judicial Discretion: A Look Back and a Look Forward Five Years After Booker, 22
FED. SENT’G REP. 297 (2010). We appreciate the Cardozo Law Review’s publication of our
Article on short notice and an abbreviated schedule.
1 See Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug.
9, 2003) [hereinafter Kennedy Speech] (transcript available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_08-09-03.html); Stephen Breyer, Federal
Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 180 (1999); William H. Rehnquist,
Luncheon Address (June 18, 1993), in U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, DRUGS AND VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA 283, 287 (1993); see also Carol J. Williams, Justice Kennedy Laments the State of
Prisons in California, U.S., L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2010, at AA5.
2 See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Judges Give Thumbs Down to Crack, Pot, Porn Mandatory
Minimums, NAT’L L.J., June 16, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=
1202462736591; Mandatory Minimums and Unintended Consequences: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 34-66 (2009) [hereinafter Mandatory Minimums Hearing] (statement of Hon. Julie E.
Carnes, Chair, Criminal Law Comm. of the Judicial Conference of the U.S.), available at 2009
WLNR 13897800; David M. Zlotnick, The Future of Federal Sentencing Policy: Learning
Lessons from Republican Judicial Appointees in the Guidelines Era, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1
(2008); John S. Martin, Jr., Why Mandatory Minimums Make No Sense, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 311 (2004); Jack B. Weinstein, Every Day is a Good Day for a Judge to
Lay Down his Professional Life for Justice, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 131 (2004); Michael Edmund
O’Neill, Surveying Article III Judges’ Perspectives on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 15
FED. SENT’G REP. 215 (2003); Gerard E. Lynch, Sentencing Eddie, 91 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 547 (2001); MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & SCOTT A. GILBERT, FED. JUDICIAL
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interesting, and potentially influential, response to mandatory
minimums has come from the political branches.
At various times in their careers, the past three presidents have
doubted the wisdom of long mandatory sentences. 3 Likewise, some
federal lawmakers, prosecutors, and even a former “Drug Czar” have
disputed the justice of mandatory minimums. 4 In a much-publicized
case, dozens of former federal prosecutors and high-ranking Justice
Department officials filed amici curiae briefs in support of the
defendant, who was facing a 55-year mandatory sentence for relatively
minor marijuana deals and related conduct. 5 After the appellate court
upheld the sentence and the Supreme Court denied certiorari, a
conservative federal lawmaker “question[ed] some severe mandatory
CTR., THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES: RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER’S 1996
SURVEY (1997); Marc Miller & Daniel J. Freed, Editors’ Observations: The Chasm Between the
Judiciary and the Congress over Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 59 (1993);
see also infra note 5; cf. Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753, 799-802 nn.21829 (2002) (providing citations to judicial criticisms of drug-related sentences).
3 See Senator Barack Obama, Address at the Howard University Convocation (Sept. 28,
2007) [hereinafter Obama Address] (transcript available at http://www.barackobama.com/2007/
09/28/remarks_of_senator_barack_obam_26.php); Frank Davies, Drug Czar Vacancy Exposes
Policy Divide in GOP, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 23, 2001, at A29 (quoting CNN interview with
President-elect George W. Bush); Interview by Rolling Stone Magazine with President William J.
Clinton (Nov. 2, 2000) (transcript available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000/12/2000-12-07interview-of-the-president-by-rolling-stone-magazine-a.html). Moreover, President George H.W.
Bush expressed opposition to mandatory minimums in 1970 while serving in Congress. See 116
CONG. REC. H33314 (Sept. 23, 1970) (statement of Rep. George H.W. Bush) [hereinafter Bush
Speech], reprinted in 3 FED. SENT’G REP. 108 (1990).
4 See, e.g., Press Release, Rep. Bob Inglis, New Poll: Americans Oppose Mandatory
Minimums, Will Vote for Candidates Who Feel the Same (Sept. 24, 2008), available at
http://www.famm.org/NewsandInformation/PressReleases/CorrectingCoursereportandpollrelease.
aspx; Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Laws–The Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1
(2007) (statement of Rep. Bobby Scott), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/
110th/36343.PDF; Christopher S. Wren, Public Lives: A Drug Warrior Who Would Rather Treat
Than Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2001, at A12 (quoting former U.S. Drug Czar Barry McCaffrey);
Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing Commission,
Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Effective Sentencing System,
28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 192-95 (1993); see also Jiles H. Ship, Second Vice President,
Nat’l Org. of Black Law Enforcement Execs., Testimony at Public Hearing Before the U.S.
Sentencing Commission (May 27, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.ussc.gov/
AGENDAS/20100527/Hearing_Transcript.pdf); U.S. Conference of Mayors, 2006 Adopted
Resolutions: Opposing Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 47-48 (2006), http://www.usmayors.org/
resolutions/74th_conference/resolutions_adopted_2006.pdf; infra note 16 and accompanying text
(referencing support for reform of crack cocaine law).
5 The group included four former U.S. Attorneys General and a former Director of the F.B.I.
See Brief for 145 Individuals, Including Former United States Attorneys General et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Angelos v. United States, 549 U.S. 1077 (2006) (No. 06-26), 2006
WL 3090058; United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 738-39 (10th Cir. 2005) (listing amici
curiae); United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1256 & n.136 (D. Utah 2004) (same). In
the interest of full disclosure, the Angelos case was decided by Cassell while a U.S. District Court
Judge for the District of Utah. Luna served as appellate counsel for Mr. Angelos in seeking to
have Cassell’s decision overturned. Cf. Erik Luna & Troy L. Booher, Op-Ed., Mandatory
Minimums Sound Good But Are Unjust, DESERT MORNING NEWS, Dec. 21, 2006, at A22.
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minimum sentencing laws, especially in the context of drug
enforcement,” adding that “[i]n the long run, it may be just as important
to provide rehabilitation and treatment programs, instead of imposing
unreasonably harsh sentences.” 6
Conservative commentators and organizations have spoken out
against mandatory minimums as well. 7 Moreover, opinion polls
suggest that opposition is growing within the general public. A recent
survey found that a majority of those polled opposed mandatory
minimums for non-violent offenses and stated that they would vote for a
congressional candidate who supports ending such sentences. 8 Given
changes in the political branches, it now appears that considerable
interest exists in moving beyond a verbal critique of these laws to
enacting statutory reforms.
After noting that then-President George W. Bush had been
skeptical of lengthy sentences for first-time drug offenders, thenSenator Barack Obama stated: “I agree with the President. The
difference is he hasn’t done anything about it. When I’m President, I
will. We will review these sentences to see where we can be smarter on
crime and reduce the blind and counterproductive warehousing of nonviolent offenders.” 9 Shortly after taking office, Attorney General Eric
Holder created a working group to examine federal sentencing policy
and to make recommendations for reform. 10 In addition, Congress has
6 Robert Gehrke, Drug Deals Costly: 55 Years, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 5, 2006, available at
http://www.sentencing.nj.gov/downloads/pdf/articles/2007/Jan2007/news25.pdf (quoting Sen.
Orrin Hatch).
7 See, e.g., Mandatory Minimums Hearing, supra note 2, at 66-70 (statement of Grover
Norquist, President, Americans for Tax Reform), available at 2009 WL 2027216; id. at 117-19
(statement of David A. Keene, Chairman, American Conservative Union) [hereinafter Keene
Testimony], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-48_51013.pdf;
Timothy Egan, The Nation: Hard Time; Less Crime, More Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1999,
§ 4, at 41 (quoting Ed Meese, former U.S. Attorney General and Senior Fellow at the Heritage
Foundation); David B. Muhlhausen, Senior Policy Analyst, The Heritage Found., Testimony at
Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission (May 27, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20100527/Testimony_Muhlhausen.pdf); see also infra note 16
and accompanying text (referencing support for reform of crack cocaine law).
8 See, e.g., Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Omnibus Survey (2008),
http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/FAMM%20poll%20no%20embargo.pdf
[hereinafter
Omnibus Survey]; see also EAGLETON INSTITUTE OF POLITICS CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEREST
POLLING, NEW JERSEY’S OPINIONS ON ALTERNATIVES TO MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING
(2004), available at http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/NJ%20Eagleton%20Poll.pdf; PETER
D. HART RESEARCH ASSOCS., OPEN SOC’Y INST., CHANGING PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2002), available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/CJI-Poll.pdf;
Survey Finds Support for Drug Law Reform, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 29, 1999, at 1; cf. Julian V. Roberts,
Public Opinion and Mandatory Sentences of Imprisonment: A Review of International Findings,
30 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 483 (2003).
9 Obama Address, supra note 3.
10 See Sally Quillian Yates, U.S. Att’y, N. Dist. of Ga., Testimony at Public Hearing Before
the U.S. Sentencing Commission (May 27, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.ussc.gov/
AGENDAS/20100527/Testimony_Yates_DOJ.pdf); Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at the
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directed the U.S. Sentencing Commission to submit a comprehensive
report on mandatory minimums by the end of October 2010. 11
The most recent events also augur well for reform. On August 3,
2010, President Obama signed into law the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,
which reduces the sentencing disparity between crack and powder
cocaine offenses. 12 Previously, possession with intent to distribute 50
grams (less than 2 ounces) of crack cocaine resulted in a 10-year
mandatory sentence, while it would take 5000 grams (approximately 11
pounds) of powder cocaine to generate the same mandatory minimum.
And while possession with intent to distribute 500 grams of powder
cocaine is still necessary to trigger a 5-year mandatory term, simple
possession of 5 grams (about a teaspoon) of crack cocaine used to carry
a 5-year mandatory federal sentence. 13
The Fair Sentencing Act eliminated the mandatory minimum for
simple possession of crack cocaine—the first time a federal mandatory
minimum had been repealed since the Nixon Administration—and it
reduced the crack/powder disparity, from 100:1 to 18:1, by upping the
required amount of crack cocaine to trigger a mandatory sentence. 14
Lauded as “a courageous and historic step” toward fairness in the
federal criminal justice system, 15 the law received broad bipartisan
support, including the backing of conservative lawmakers and
commentators, as well as prominent law enforcement organizations. 16
Both authors of this article believe that reforming the federal
mandatory minimum scheme would be good for the country. At the
same time, however, there are substantial political barriers to making
any change. Although public support for mandatory minimums has
waned in recent times, it is still possible to paint a legislator who votes
to repeal mandatory minimums as being “soft on crime.” For example,

2009 ABA Convention (Aug. 3, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches
/2009/ag-speech-090803.html).
11 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 4713,
123 Stat. 2190, 2843-44 (2009).
12 Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 21 and 28 U.S.C.).
13 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844 (2006).
14 In other words, it now takes 28 grams of crack cocaine to trigger a 5-year mandatory
sentence and 280 grams of crack cocaine to generate a 10-year mandatory sentence.
15 See Editorial, Crack Breakthrough: The Fair Sentencing Act Corrects a Longtime Wrong
in Cocaine Cases, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2010, at A14; see also Editorial, Compromising on
Cocaine, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 2010, at A24; Editorial, Matter of Conviction, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, July 29, 2010, at A20.
16 See Families Against Mandatory Minimums, The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,
http://www.famm.org/FederalSentencing/USCongress/BillsinCongress/TheFairSentencingActof2
010.aspx (last visited Aug. 31, 2010) (providing support letters from U.S. Senators, conservative
commentators and organizations, the National District Attorneys Association, the Federal Law
Enforcement Officers Association, and the National Association of Police Organizations, as well
as press releases from federal lawmakers and the U.S. Attorney General).
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when then-presidential candidate Obama called for reexamination of
mandatory minimum sentences, he was attacked as “oppos[ing]
mandatory prison sentences for sex offenders, drug dealers, and
murderers.” 17
No reform is immune from criticism, of course, and even the new
crack cocaine law had its detractors. Among others, the ranking
Republican on the House Judiciary Committee, Lamar Smith, argued
that history and experience justified the mandatory minimum.
“Reducing the penalties for crack cocaine offenders could expose our
neighborhoods to the same violence and addiction that caused Congress
to act in the first place.” 18 Along the way, Rep. Smith posed a series of
rhetorical questions:
• “[W]hy do we want to make it more difficult to take drug traffickers off
the streets and easier for them to peddle their lethal product?”
• “[W]hy should we reduce the [punishment] for defendants who are more
violent, more likely to have criminal records[?] Why are we coddling
some of the most dangerous drug traffickers in America?”
• “Why enact legislation that could endanger our children and bring
violence back to our inner-city communities?” 19

The speech referenced an earlier House version of the crack
cocaine bill, which would have eliminated the sentencing disparity
altogether (i.e., a 1:1 ratio), emphasizing that the bill was reported over
Republican opposition. “Mr. Speaker, the Democratic Party teeters on
the edge of becoming the face of deficits, drugs, and job destruction,”
Rep. Smith concluded. “I cannot support legislation that might enable
the violent and devastating crack cocaine epidemic of the past to
become a clear and present danger.” 20
The effectiveness of such arguments has yet to be determined, but
one could imagine similar rhetorical questions being posed in
opposition to further changes in mandatory minimum law. Some might
dismiss this as a game of polemics, merely intended to stir the political
base or prod the electorate at large. To be fair, however, arguments
made in support of the status quo deserve thoughtful consideration,
either because of the truth they may contain or the popular and political

17 See Fact Check: Does Obama Oppose Mandatory Prison Sentences for Violent Criminals
and Drug Dealers?, CNN.COM, Oct. 23, 2008, http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2008/10/23/
fact-check-does-obama-oppose-mandatory-prison-sentences-for-violent-criminals-and-drugdealers/?fbid=eYid2oTJ1AX.
18 156 CONG. REC. H6197 (daily ed. July 28, 2010) (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith), 156
Cong Rec H6196-01, at *H6197 (Westlaw).
19 Id. at H6197-98.
20 Id. at H6198.
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sentiment they represent. 21 Regardless of the merits, the current
environment may not be conducive to the broadest vistas of sentencing
reform.
Although the new crack cocaine law is momentous, it directly
impacts only one type of prospective federal defendant—the crack
cocaine offender—leaving all other mandatory minimums in place. 22
The ultimate legislation also eschewed the reformers’ desired 1:1
sentencing parity for crack and powder cocaine offenses, a change that
would have faced powerful opposition. Moreover, the law itself
demanded greater sentencing enhancements for all drug offenses—a
provision that was specifically, and positively, referenced by law
enforcement officials. 23
In general, advocates of further reforms will face long-standing
political hurdles. Even during periods of lower crime rates, the public
has expressed fear of victimization and a belief that criminals are not
receiving harsh enough punishment. 24 Lawmakers have responded in
21 For instance, powder and crack cocaine are pharmacologically identical, but the method of
ingestion, sniffing versus smoking, may have different effects on the user.
Although oral cocaine use might produce the same magnitude increase in dopamine as
that of cocaine that is smoked or used intravenously, the rapid change in dopamine
levels that occurs by these latter routes is more reinforcing. That is why smoking
[cocaine] has greater abuse liability than snorted or oral routes of administration.
Margaret Haney, Neurobiology of Stimulants, in THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC PUBLISHING
TEXTBOOK OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 143, 144 (Marc Galanter & Herbert D. Kleber
eds., 4th ed. 2008) (citation omitted); see also David A. Gorelick & Jennifer L. Cornish, The
Pharmacology of Cocaine, Amphetamines, and Other Stimulants, in PRINCIPLES OF ADDICTION
MEDICINE 157, 161, 166 (Allan W. Graham et al. eds., 3d ed. 2003). Likewise, it has been
argued that crack cocaine has a devastating effect on poor, mostly minority communities. See,
e.g., United States v. McMurray, 833 F. Supp. 1454, 1467 (D. Neb. 1993) (“[I]f ‘crack’ cocaine is
as dangerous as Congress believes it to be, and poor people in general, and poor blacks in
particular, are victimized more frequently by the sale of ‘crack’ than whites, the social costs of
‘disproportionate’ prosecution of African Americans might be deemed acceptable precisely so
that other poor people, including poor blacks, are afforded some protection from the scourge of
‘crack.’”); see also Drew S. Days III, Race and the Federal Criminal Justice System: A Look at
the Issue of Selective Prosecution, 48 ME. L. REV. 179, 184-93 (1996); Randall Kennedy, The
State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255 (1994).
But see, e.g., infra note 70 (discussing socially harmful effects of racial discrimination, real or
perceived); Impact of S. 1789, The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, FAMILIES AGAINST
MANDATORY MINIMUMS, 1 (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/S1789
%20impact%20factsheet%203.pdf (referencing benefits of new crack cocaine law); cf. infra notes
46-65 and accompanying text (discussing arguments against mandatory minimums).
22 The changes are not retroactive—in other words, they do not apply to offenders who were
already serving a federal sentence or to those whose offenses occurred before the bill was signed
into law. Cf. infra note 366.
23 See supra note 16 (referencing law enforcement letters). Moreover, the law increased
criminal fines. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 4, 124 Stat. 2372, 237273 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 960).
24 See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE tbl.2.39.2009 (2009), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/
pdf/t2392009.pdf [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK ONLINE]; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, at 140-41 tbl.2.47
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kind with new crimes and stiffer penalties, including mandatory
sentences. 25 Conversely, proposals for comprehensive reform have
carried a career-ending risk for supporters, who could be labeled soft on
crime by allegedly providing the means for dangerous criminals to
escape with lenient sentences. This political dynamic has stymied
previous efforts in Congress to reform mandatory minimums.
For these and other reasons, there may be insufficient political
support for an across-the-board repeal of federal mandatory minimums.
To date, systemic reform proposals have had little traction 26 and appear
unlikely to be adopted in the near term. Ironically, the congressional
directive calling for a review of mandatory minimum sentencing itself
contained a new mandatory minimum, and several recent bills would
extend federal mandatory sentences. 27 As a practical matter, then, any
meaningful reform might have to be done in a careful, focused way to
create a broad bipartisan consensus surrounding the changes. With this
in mind, the two of us have considered how to modify the federal
mandatory minimum scheme so as to ameliorate its most draconian and
unfair expressions.
One of us (Cassell) is a former federal judge nominated by
President George W. Bush, now a “conservative” scholar whose work is
often supportive of law enforcement, the death penalty, and the rights of
crime victims. 28 The other (Luna) is a “libertarian” who tends to be
suspicious of government and adamant about abuses of power,
including those by police and prosecutors, and his scholarship has
expressed the need for wholesale criminal justice reform (especially in

(Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire eds., 2003) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK 2003], available at
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t247.pdf.
25 See, e.g., Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703 (2005)
[hereinafter Luna, Overcriminalization].
26 See infra note 239 (referencing bills).
27 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 4712,
123 Stat. 2190, 2842-43 (2009) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1389) (setting mandatory minimum
for battery of a United States serviceman); see also infra note 68 (referencing bills that would
create additional mandatory minimums).
28 See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL & STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 2006); HUGO BEDAU & PAUL G. CASSELL, DEBATING THE
DEATH PENALTY: THE EXPERTS FROM BOTH SIDES MAKE THEIR CASE (2004); Paul G. Cassell,
The Guilty and the “Innocent”: An Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction from
False Confessions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 523 (1999) [hereinafter Cassell, The Guilty and
the “Innocent”]; Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year
Perspective on Miranda’s Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998); Paul G.
Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects
of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839 (1996); Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting
the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1988); see also
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 n.7 (2000) (noting the Court’s invitation to Cassell
to argue against the Miranda rule).
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the federal system). 29 If we could find common ground on ways to
modify federal mandatory minimums, we hoped that policymakers
might share this agreement, perhaps sowing the seeds of further
reforms. Whether or not modest congressional action spurs greater
feats, however, our proposal is far from death defying. It is instead a
fairly unpretentious yet principled modification.
Part I of this Article begins by briefly describing the background of
mandatory minimum sentencing, including arguments for and against
mandatory minimums and an analysis of their enactment in the federal
system. Part II considers the resilience of mandatory minimums from a
behavioral science perspective and then sketches a potential process of
reform in light of the relevant phenomena. Part III discusses the
concept of minimalism in philosophy and legal theory, proposing the
idea of “political minimalism” as a justification for reform efforts that
seeks consensus on basic principles accompanied by small legislative
steps. Part IV provides specific changes to federal law consistent with a
minimalist approach to statutory modification. Finally, Part V offers
some suggestions for further reforms, with the hope of inspiring
dialogue on the propriety of legislatively compelled, judicially
unavoidable punishment.
I. SOME BACKGROUND ON MANDATORY MINIMUMS
Enacted by statute, mandatory minimums set the lower limits for
sentencing particular offenses and particular offenders. If a defendant is
convicted of a given crime or has a certain criminal history—typically
measured by objective criteria (e.g., the quantity of drugs possessed or
the number of prior felony convictions)—then he must be sentenced to
at least the legislatively prescribed prison term. 30 Some of the best
examples in the federal system involve drug-related crimes. If a
defendant possessed and intended to distribute 500 grams of
29 See, e.g., Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011); Erik Luna, Criminal Justice and the Public Imagination, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 71 (2009) [hereinafter Luna, Public Imagination]; Erik Luna, Drug Détente, 20 FED. SENT’G
REP. 304 (2008); Erik Luna, Traces of a Libertarian Theory of Punishment, 90 MARQUETTE L.
REV. 263 (2007); Erik Luna, Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of Federal Sentencing, 96 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 25 (2005) [hereinafter Luna, Gridland]; Erik Luna, System Failure, 42
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1201 (2005); Luna, Overcriminalization, supra note 25; Erik Luna, Race,
Crime, and Institutional Design, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 183 (2003) [hereinafter Luna,
Institutional Design]; Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753 (2002); Erik Luna,
Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 517 (2000) [hereinafter Luna,
Principled Enforcement]; Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107 (2000); see
also Erik Luna, http://www.cato.org/people/erik-luna (last visited Aug. 31, 2010).
30 Mandatory minimums may also be triggered by victim characteristics, such as selling drugs
to someone under the age of eighteen. See 21 U.S.C. § 861 (2006).
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methamphetamine, he must be sentenced to at least 10 years
imprisonment. 31 As a general rule, mandatory minimum sentencing
schemes follow a type of austere syllogism, where a defendant found
guilty of X—the trigger, such as distributing a certain amount of
contraband or carrying a firearm during a drug transaction—must then
receive at least Y sentence (e.g., 5 years imprisonment). 32
Federal mandatory minimums have existed throughout the nation’s
history, stretching back to 1790 with the enactment of life sentences for
murder and piracy, and a 10-year minimum prison term for causing a
ship to run aground by using a false light. 33 Since then, Congress has
continued to add fixed sentencing floors to federal law, with dozens of
such provisions in effect today. 34 Due to the number of mandatory
minimums in the U.S. Code, a broad array of conduct might be eligible
for inexorable levels of punishment. Nonetheless, most federal cases
carrying mandatory minimums involve drugs, guns, or both—with, for
instance, nearly two-thirds of all drug sentences subject to mandatory
minimums. 35
A.

Basic Arguments

Mandatory minimum sentencing schemes have been the focus of
relatively straightforward arguments—both on their behalf 36 and in
31
32
33

See id. § 844(b)(1)(A)(viii).
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
See id. § 1111 (murder); id. §§ 1651-1653, 1655 (piracy); id. § 1658 (false light); see also
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 6-11 (1991) [hereinafter SPECIAL
REPORT], available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/MANMIN.PDF (providing history of
federal mandatory minimums).
34 See Federal Mandatory Minimum Statutes, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS
(Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/FEDERAL%20MANDATORY%20
MINIMUMS%202.23.10.doc; SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 33, at app. A (listing statutory
provisions requiring mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment).
35 See, e.g., Mandatory Minimums Hearing, supra note 2, at 124-55 [hereinafter Statistical
Overview], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-48_51013.pdf
(statistical overview report from the U.S. Sentencing Commission).
36 See, e.g., Maxwell V. Jackson, Chief of Police, Harrisville City, Utah, Testimony at Public
Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission (May 27, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20100527/Testimony_Jackson.pdf); David Hiller, Nat’l Vice
President, Grand Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police, Testimony at Public Hearing Before the U.S.
Sentencing Commission (May 27, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.ussc.gov/
AGENDAS/20100527/Testimony_Hiller_FOP.pdf); Mandatory Minimums Hearing, supra note
2, at 71-78 (statement of Michael J. Sullivan, Partner, Ashcroft Sullivan, LLC), available at 2009
WLNR 13385871; Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Laws–The Issues: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 104 (2007) (statement of Richard B. Roper, U.S. Att’y, N. Dist. of Tex.), reprinted in 19
FED. SENT’G REP. 352 (2007) [hereinafter Roper Statement]; Jay Apperson, The Lock-‘em-Up
Debate; What Prosecutors Know: Mandatory Minimums Work, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1994, at
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favor of their repeal. 37 The following provides some of the more
frequent claims that have been made over the years.
1.

For Mandatory Minimums

Proponents of mandatory minimums point to the problems raised
by the former federal sentencing system, which professionals and
politicians of all political stripes described as “lawless”38 and a major
source of public cynicism. Historically speaking, federal trial judges
had unguided discretion in determining sentences within broad statutory
ranges.
This discretion purportedly generated intolerable (even
C1; Michael M. Baylson, Mandatory Minimum Sentences: A Federal Prosecutor’s Viewpoint, 40
FED. B. NEWS & J. 167 (1993); Robert S. Mueller, III, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 4 FED.
SENT’G REP. 230 (1992); cf. Debate: Mandatory Minimums in Drug Sentencing: A Valuable
Weapon in the War on Drugs or a Handcuff on Judicial Discretion?, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279
(1999) (debate between Rep. Asa Hutchinson and U.S. District Court Judge Stanley Sporkin);
SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 13-14 (listing purported goals of mandatory minimums);
supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
37 See, e.g., Michael Nachmanoff, Fed. Pub. Defender, E. Dist. of Va., Testimony at Public
Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission (May 27, 2010) [hereinafter Nachmanoff
Testimony] (transcript available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20100527/Testimony_
Nachmanoff.pdf); Cynthia Hujar Orr, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers,
Testimony at Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission (May 27, 2010) (transcript
available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20100527/Testimony_Hujar_Orr_NACDL.pdf);
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Professor of Law, George Washington Univ. Sch. of Law, Testimony at
Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission (May 27, 2010) [hereinafter Saltzburg
Testimony] (transcript available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20100527/Testimony_
Saltzburg.pdf); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Professor of Law, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Testimony at
Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission (May 27, 2010) [hereinafter Schulhofer
Testimony] (transcript available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20100527/Testimony_
Schulhofer.pdf); Erik Luna, Testimony at Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing
Commission (May 27, 2010) [hereinafter Luna Testimony] (transcript available at
http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20100527/Testimony_Luna.pdf); Marc Mauer, Exec. Dir., The
Sentencing Project, Testimony at Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission (May
27, 2010) [hereinafter Mauer Testimony] (transcript available at http://www.ussc.gov/
AGENDAS/20100527/Testimony_Mauer_Sentencing_Project.pdf); Julie Stewart, President,
Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Testimony at Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing
Commission (May 27, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20100527/
Testimony_Stewart.pdf); Jay Rorty, Dir. of the Drug Law Reform Project, Am. Civil Liberties
Union, Testimony at Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission (May 27, 2010)
(transcript available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20100527/Testimony_Rorty.pdf);
Michael Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Effects of Mandatory Penalties: Two Centuries of
Consistent Findings, 38 CRIME & JUST. 65 (2009); Symposium, Mandatory Minimums and the
Curtailment of Judicial Discretion: Does the Time Fit the Crime?, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL’Y 303 (2004); Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the
Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61 (1993); Hatch, supra note 4;
Henry Scott Wallace, Mandatory Minimums and the Betrayal of Sentencing Reform, 40 FED. B.
NEWS & J. 158, 161 (1993); SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 33; see also supra notes 1-17; infra
notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
38 See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973);
Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1972).
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unconstitutional) disparities among defendants, with sentences turning
on the temperament of a given judge or irrelevant factors like race and
class.
Mandatory minimums help eliminate these inequalities,
proponents argue, by providing uniformity and fairness for defendants,
certainty and predictability of outcomes, and a higher level of truth and
integrity in sentencing.
Mandatory minimums allegedly serve the theoretical goals of
punishment as well, guaranteeing that criminals receive the punishment
they deserve (i.e., retribution) and are effectively deterred and
incapacitated. 39 According to proponents, the ostensible subjects of
mandatory minimums—high-level offenders who perpetrate violent and
serious crimes—can only be assured of receiving their just deserts
through long, compulsory sentences. Taking into consideration ordinal
and cardinal scaling of punishment in America, few retributivists would
balk at a life sentence for a serial murderer, for instance, and most
mandatory minimums imposed for serious crimes of violence (e.g.,
forcible rape) will fall within the rough boundaries of deserved
punishment. Without mandatory minimums, proponents thus claim,
judges might issue undeservedly lenient sentences for these violent
offenders.
With respect to deterrence, mandatory minimum sentences are
sometimes justified as sending an unmistakable message to criminals.
The certain, predictable, and harsh sentences forewarn offenders of the
consequences of their behavior upon apprehension and conviction.
Many mandatory minimums employ clear, often formulaic terms,
giving them a bumper-sticker quality. “Use a gun, go to jail” is a
classic example, 40 with the requisite punishment aimed at discouraging
the convicted offender from ever using a firearm again (specific
deterrence), as well as dissuading other people from committing gunrelated crimes in the first place (general deterrence).
Proponents contend that mandatory minimums also incapacitate
the most incorrigible criminals, particularly those with long rap sheets
and no apparent hope of rehabilitation. 41 Anti-recidivist provisions,
such as “three strikes” laws in various states, fall within this category.
In California, an individual previously convicted of two serious or
violent felonies who then commits another felony is literally

39 For overviews of major punishment theories and criticisms, see JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT
WEISBERG & GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 29-75 (6th ed. 2008);
Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice,
2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 207-42 (2003) [hereinafter Luna, Punishment Theory].
40 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.06 (West 2010).
41 As far as we know, no plausible argument has been made that mandatory sentencing serves
rehabilitation, the other major utilitarian goal of punishment.

LUNA.CASSELL.32-1

12

9/13/2010 12:25:07 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:1

incapacitated, 42 often put behind bars for the rest of his life and thereby
prevented from committing crimes against the law-abiding public.
Another plausible argument for mandatory minimums is their
ability to induce guilty pleas and cooperation. The threat of long,
obligatory sentences tends to encourage plea bargaining, which, if
successful, averts the substantial costs associated with trial. In fact,
ninety-five percent of all federal prosecutions terminate by guilty plea, 43
with mandatory minimum sentences helping to keep that figure
extremely high. Moreover, the possibility of a long sentence provides a
powerful incentive for members of a criminal group to provide
information to law enforcement and to assist in the prosecution of other
offenders. Low-level participants can avoid mandatory minimums by
fingering bigger players, 44 allowing prosecutors to move up the chain of
command.
Some organized criminal enterprises may be impossible to unravel
and eventually put out of business, supporters argue, unless the
government has the leverage provided by severe punishment. Mob
prosecutions provide a standard example, where much information and
trial evidence might be unattainable without the stick of long sentences
(and the carrot of immunity grants). The same obstacles may apply in
other forms of concerted criminality, from violent street gangs to
sophisticated white-collar offenders. Aside from its pragmatic benefits,
a defendant might earn a form of moral credit through his willingness to
cooperate with law enforcement. The provision of information and the
acceptance of responsibility may demonstrate genuine remorsefulness
on the part of the offender and a willingness to help redress the harm
that he may have caused. 45
Finally, prosecutors can temper mandatory minimums through the
sound exercise of discretion, foregoing charges that would produce
excessive punishment. According to supporters, federal law
enforcement focuses on sophisticated, violent, long-term conspiracies,
sometimes with international dimensions, meaning that the recipients of
mandatory minimum sentences will be major players in such schemes
or serious recidivists who use deadly weapons to further their illegal
aims. Harsh federal sentences also complement state criminal justice
systems, proponents claim, providing a backstop of sorts in cases of
concurrent jurisdiction. When an offender would get off easily under a

42
43

See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(e)(2), 1170(c).
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT fig.C (2008) [hereinafter 2008
ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2008/FigC.pdf.
44 See, e.g., infra note 72.
45 See infra text accompanying note 373 (mentioning moral relevance of defendant’s
assistance).
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state regime, federal prosecutors can employ mandatory minimums to
ensure an appropriate sentence.
2.

Against Mandatory Minimums

Opponents of mandatory minimums sometimes challenge the
image of vast disparity in punishment prior to the enactment of
determinate sentencing in the federal system. 46 Even accepting the
historical accuracy of the conventional narrative, however, mandatory
minimums may have done little to eliminate punishment discrepancies
among similarly situated defendants. Inconsistent application of
mandatory minimums has only exacerbated disparities, opponents
argue, expanding the sentencing differentials in analogous cases.
According to most critics, the source of this problem is manifest:
Mandatory minimums effectively transfer sentencing authority from
trial judges to federal prosecutors, who may pre-set punishment through
creative investigative and charging practices, producing troubling
punishment differentials among offenders with similar culpability. 47
Mandatory minimums may also conflict with the notion that a
judge should ensure that the punishment fits the crime and the criminal,
a precept “deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law
jurisprudence.” 48 They eliminate judicial discretion to impose a prison
term lower than the statutory floor, making case-specific information
about the offense and offender irrelevant, at least to the extent that these
facts might call for a below-minimum sentence. For this reason,
opponents believe it is far from obvious that mandatory minimums
ensure an offender receives his “just deserts” or any other retributive
formulation. All theories of retribution require that the punishment be
proportionate to the gravity of the offense, and any decent retributive
theory demands an upper sentencing limit. 49 Mandatory minimums are
indifferent to proportionality concerns, however, and can pierce
retributive boundaries with preordained punishment.
They may not fulfill consequentialist goals either, opponents
continue, rejecting the idea that mandatory sentences provide
meaningful deterrence or incapacitation. 50 Clarity and certainty of
punishment are not synonymous with deterrence, which requires that a
defendant not only know the rule, but also believe that the costs
46
47
48
49

See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text; infra note 70 and accompanying text.
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284-85 (1983).
See generally ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE
SENTENCING: EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES (2005); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 52-54 (5th ed. 2005).
50 See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
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outweigh the benefits from violating the law and then apply this
understanding to decision-making at the time of the crime. As
opponents note, however, most offenders neither perceive this balance
of costs and benefits nor follow the rational actor model. 51
Incapacitation is only effective if: (1) the imprisoned person would
otherwise be committing crime, and (2) he is not replaced by others.
Mandatory minimums prove problematic on both criteria, opponents
contend. Offenders typically age out of the criminal lifestyle, with long
sentences requiring the continued incarceration of individuals who
present little danger of further crimes. 52 Moreover, certain offenses
subject to mandatory minimums can draw upon a large supply of
potential participants; with drug organizations, for example, an arrested
dealer or courier is quickly replaced by another. 53
Aside from the goals of punishment, there is a genuine question as
to the propriety of extracting information and guilty pleas through the
threat of mandatory minimums. Opponents claim that such practices
impose a “trial tax” on defendants who exercise their constitutional
rights to trial by jury, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and other trialrelated guarantees—the tax being the mandatory minimum sentence that
otherwise would not have been imposed. 54 Sometimes maximum
leverage is obtained through a process known as “charge stacking” (or
“count stacking”), whereby the government divides up a single criminal
episode into multiple crimes, each carrying its own mandatory sentence
that can then be stacked, one on top of the other, to produce heavier
punishment. 55
This practice seems particularly troubling when the government
procures further crimes through its own actions, as when law
enforcement arranges a number of controlled drug buys in order to

51 For discussions on the irrationality and myopic behavior of criminals, see, for example,
David S. Lee & Justin McCrary, Crime, Punishment, and Myopia (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 11491, 2005); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of
Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At its Worst When Doing its Best, 91 GEO.
L.J. 949, 953 (2003); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting
of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-7 (1999).
52 See, e.g., David P. Farrington, Age and Crime, 7 CRIME & JUST. 189 (1986); Travis Hirschi
& Michael Gottfredson, Age and the Explanation of Crime, 89 AM. J. SOC. 552 (1983). It has
also been argued that prisons serve as “colleges for criminals,” where offenders learn new antisocial skills, for instance, and come out more likely to recidivate. See, e.g., Luna, Punishment
Theory, supra note 39, at 220.
53 See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, 19801996, 26 CRIME & JUST. 17, 57 (1999). Moreover, arguments for incapacitation inevitably
disregard crime committed in correctional facilities.
54 See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
55 See, e.g., Luna, Overcriminalization, supra note 25, at 723-24; William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 519-20 (2001) [hereinafter
Stuntz, Pathological Politics].
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achieve a lengthy sentence. 56 In multi-defendant cases, there is also an
issue of fairness when disparate punishment is the result of a “race to
the prosecutor’s office,” with the defendant who pleads first—
sometimes the one who has the savviest or most experienced defense
counsel—avoiding a long mandatory sentence.
Reasonable opponents do not doubt that federal law enforcement is
well intentioned in most cases. However, they believe it is naïve to
assume that prosecutorial discretion will prevent the misuse of
mandatory minimums, with experience showing that governmental
good faith will not always suffice. Although serious and violent
offenders may have inspired some mandatory minimums, the statutes
themselves are not tailored to these criminals alone and instead act as
grants of power to federal prosecutors to apply the laws as they see fit,
even to minor participants in non-violent offenses. 57 Opponents
emphasize that prosecutors are influenced by the ordinary human
motivations that may at times cause a loss of perspective—path
dependence, career advancement, immodesty, and occasional
vindictiveness 58 —leading to the misapplication of mandatory
minimums.
To check potential abuses of executive power, American law has
historically entrusted the courts with certain fundamental criminal
justice decisions. 59 Among the issues properly assigned to the
judiciary, opponents argue, is the appropriate sentence for a given
offender. Under the current regime, however, no viable judicial check
prevents the misapplication of mandatory minimums, which leads to
several unsettling consequences. For instance, mandatory schemes can
have a “tariff” effect, where some basic fact triggers the same minimum
sentence regardless of whether the defendant was a low-level drug
courier or instead a narcotics kingpin. 60 Opponents claim that the tariffs
are often levied on the least culpable members in a criminal episode.
Unlike those in leadership positions, low-level offenders often lack the
type of valuable information that can be used as a bargaining chip with
prosecutors.
In addition, mandatory minimums can have a “cliff” effect,
drawing seemingly trivial lines with huge consequences. The most
striking examples often involve illegal drugs, where offenders face
steep cliffs at quantity cutoffs. Someone caught with, say, 0.9 grams of
LSD might receive a relatively short sentence—but add on a fraction of
a gram and a half-decade in federal prison necessarily follows, with the
56
57
58
59
60

See, e.g., United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1253 (D. Utah 2004).
See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 55, at 549.
See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 203, 218 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., United States v. Brigham, 977 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1992).
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defendant falling off the metaphorical cliff. 61 Moreover, the mechanical
nature of mandatory minimums can entangle all criminal justice actors
in an oxymoronic process where facts are negotiable, from the amount
of drugs to the existence of a gun. The participants figuratively
“swallow the gun” in order to avoid a factual record that would require
a mandatory sentence. 62
Opponents might level two final objections against mandatory
minimums, one skeptical of federal criminal justice and the other
supportive of the national system. The former is concerned with federal
encroachment on state prerogatives and the implementation of policies
that appear to conflict with local choices. Most drug and weapons
crimes amenable to federal mandatory minimums are actually
prosecuted in state courts pursuant to state laws carrying much lower
sentences. 63 It is hardly disputed, however, that the possibility of severe
punishment can influence the choice of whether to pursue a federal or
state prosecution. For some, this prospect raises serious questions about
the propriety of bringing charges in federal rather than state court,
particularly where the prosecution is pursued, not because the case
implicates a special national interest, but because it jacks up the
potential punishment.
Those who believe in broad federal powers may resist mandatory
minimums for a different reason—the distortive impact on a system of
federal sentencing guidelines that they see as finely tuned. Justice
Breyer, a former U.S. Sentencing Commissioner, has raised objections
on this precise ground, arguing that mandatory minimums thwart the
Commission in its fundamental duty: “the development, in part through
research, of a rational, coherent set of punishments.” 64 Mandatory
minimums can preclude the Commission from calibrating sentences
based on normatively or empirically relevant factors, such as the
defendant’s role or culpability for a crime. All offenders thus receive
the same minimum sentence once the basic statutory predicates are met,
regardless of very real and morally significant differences. Opponents
also point out that mandatory minimums distort sentences for entire
classes of crimes. 65 Given that the Commission seeks continuity and

61
62
63

See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v) (2006).
See infra note 302 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., SOURCEBOOK ONLINE, supra note 24, at tbls. 5.17.2004, 5.38.2008, 5.44.2004,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/tost_5.html; United States v. Snyder, 954 F. Supp. 19 (D.
Mass. 1997); Wallace, supra note 37.
64 Breyer, supra note 1; Hatch, supra note 4, at 194.
65 For example, the “penalty gap” between fraud and drug cases was used to pressure the
Commission to amend U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 2B1.1. Although major corporate scandals
provided the impetus for change, the resulting increase in sentences for all fraud offenders had the
effect of limiting or precluding non-prison alternatives for many low-level offenders. See Frank
O. Bowman, III, Pour Encourager Les Autres? The Curious History and Distressing Implications
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consistency among similar offenses, a mandatory minimum for one
crime may generate a type of sentencing inflation, skewing punishment
upward for all related crimes.
B.

The Rise and Persistence of Mandatory Minimums

The two of us often disagree on criminal justice issues. As
mentioned earlier, one of us (Luna) is suspicious of government activity
on principle and especially concerned about abuses of power in the
criminal justice system, while the other (Cassell) tends to have more
favorable views of law enforcement and is most concerned about the
rights of crime victims. But we both agree that mandatory minimums
can produce patently unjustifiable sentences and that some type of
safeguard is necessary for such cases.
We are not alone. The need for reform has long been recognized
by practitioners, researchers, public interest groups, and prominent legal
organizations like the American Bar Association and the American Law
Institute. 66 The growing opposition to mandatory minimums goes
beyond the usual suspects (e.g., judges, legal scholars, criminal
defenders, and civil liberties groups) and includes conservative
commentators, politicians, and the general public. This developing
consensus and loose political coalition would seem to portend
significant reforms, presumably by Congress explicitly repealing some
or all mandatory minimum sentences currently on the books.
Until recently, however, Congress had retained all mandatory
minimum laws it had passed since 1970. In fact, mandatory sentencing
remained politically popular well into the new millennium. “Every
Administration and each Congress on a bipartisan basis has . . .
supported mandatory minimum sentencing statutes for the most serious
of offenses,” a U.S. Attorney noted in 2007, 67 a position that continues
to this day. Despite rising opposition to unduly severe punishment and
inflexible sentencing regimes—epitomized by the passage of the new
crack cocaine law—all federal mandatory minimums (save one) still
of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments
That Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 387-435 (2004).
66 See, e.g., James E. Felman, Am. Bar Ass’n, Testimony at Public Hearing Before the U.S.
Sentencing Commission (May 27, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS
/20100527/Testimony_Felman_ABA.pdf); Tonry, supra note 37, at 65-66; see also Thomas W.
Hillier, II, Member, Sentencing Initiative Blue Ribbon Comm., The Constitution Project,
Testimony at Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission (May 27, 2010) (transcript
available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20100527/Testimony_Hillier.pdf); Jeffrey B.
Steinback, Practitioner’s Advisory Grp., Testimony at Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing
Commission (May 27, 2010) [hereinafter Steinback Testimony] (transcript available at
http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20100527/Testimony_Steinback_PAG.pdf).
67 Roper Statement, supra note 36, at 352.
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exist and are likely to stay on the books, we suspect, at least for the near
term. Last year, for instance, several bills would have created
additional mandatory minimums, 68 demonstrating that the political
penchant for strict punishment remains in effect.
1.

Dissonance of Mandatory Minimums

Michael Tonry recently wrote that “[t]he greatest gap between
knowledge and policy in American sentencing concerns mandatory
penalties.” 69 So what accounts for this dissonance? For the most part,
existing research tends to undercut the principal arguments supporting
mandatory minimums, namely, that they serve the goals of punishment,
prevent sentencing disparities among defendants, and are necessary for
law enforcement to obtain cooperation from offenders.
For example, a number of studies suggest that the use of federal
mandatory minimums has tended to generate disparate sentences among
similarly situated offenders. 70 The claim of crime reduction has been

68 See, e.g., Powder-Crack Cocaine Penalty Equalization Act of 2009, H.R. 18, 111th Cong.
(2009); Illegal Immigration Enforcement and Social Security Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 98,
111th Cong. (2009); Respect for the Law Act of 2009, H.R. 128, 111th Cong. (2009); Internet
Stopping Adults Facilitating the Exploitation of Today’s Youth Act of 2009, H.R. 1076, 111th
Cong. (2009) (same as S. 436, 111th Cong. (2009)).
69 Tonry, supra note 37, at 65.
70 See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-105, FEDERAL DRUG OFFENSES:
DEPARTURES FROM SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES, FISCAL
YEARS 1999-2001 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04105.pdf; Stephen
Schulhofer & Ilene Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Guideline Circumvention and its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Era, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284
(1997); BARBARA S. VINCENT & PAUL J. HOFER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE CONSEQUENCES OF
MANDATORY MINIMUM PRISON TERMS: A SUMMARY OF RECENT FINDINGS (1994); Mandatory
Minimum Sentences: Are They Being Imposed and Who is Receiving Them?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong. (1993)
(statement of Henry R. Wray, Director, Administration of Justice Issues, General Accounting
Office), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d45t15/149743.pdf; Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J.
Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501 (1992); BARBARA S.
MEIERHOEFER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE GENERAL EFFECT OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PRISON
TERMS: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF FEDERAL SENTENCES IMPOSED (1992), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/geneffmm.pdf/$file/geneffmm.pdf; SPECIAL REPORT,
supra note 33, at 47-52; Statistical Overview, supra note 35, at 2-4.
Particularly disturbing is the appearance, if not reality, of disparities along racial or ethnic
lines. See, e.g., id. In a report by NYU’s Brennan Center for Justice, a former U.S. Attorney
recounted the following story:
I had an [Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) who] wanted to drop the gun charge against
the defendant [in a case in which] there were no extenuating circumstances. I asked,
“Why do you want to drop the gun offense?” and he said, “He is a rural guy who grew
up on a farm. The gun he had with him was a rifle. He is a good ol’ boy, and all the
good ol’ boys have rifles, and it’s not like he was a gun-toting drug dealer.” But he
[was] a gun-toting drug dealer, exactly.
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contested as well, with most researchers finding no deterrent effect from
mandatory sentencing laws. 71 The statistics also seem to belie
categorical assertions of government necessity. The rate of cooperation
(or “substantial assistance”) 72 in mandatory minimum cases is
comparable to the average in all federal cases, 73 while most recipients

BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS 11 (2010)
(alterations in original), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Justice/Prosecutorial
Discretion_report.pdf. In that case, “the question of whether to dismiss a gun charge carrying a
statutory mandatory minimum sentence turned on the prosecutor’s perception of the defendant’s
culpability, which was in turn informed in part by race.” Id. Of course, there may be a
correlation without causation; in other words, the disproportionate impact of mandatory
minimums on minorities may be based on any number of factors other than race or ethnicity.
Nonetheless, a relationship has emerged between mandatory punishments and people of color,
which can have a profoundly harmful meaning and effect regardless of causation. See, e.g., Luna,
Institutional Design, supra note 29, at 183-87.
It might also be noted that some works have challenged the assumption that the previous
federal sentencing regime was rife with disparity. See, e.g., DOUGLAS C. MCDONALD &
KENNETH E. CARLSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SENTENCING
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: DOES RACE MATTER? THE TRANSITION TO SENTENCING GUIDELINES,
1986-90 (1993); KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 104-42 (1998). Moreover, there is a lively empirical
debate as to whether the guidelines have reduced sentencing differentials. Compare U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN FEDERAL SENTENCING PRACTICES: AN
UPDATE OF THE BOOKER REPORT’S MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS (2010) [hereinafter
DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES], available at http://www.ussc.gov/general/Multivariate_
Regression_Analysis_Report_1.pdf, and Ryan W. Scott, The Effects of Booker on Inter-Judge
Sentencing Disparity, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 104 (2009) [hereinafter Scott, The Effects of Booker],
with Jeffrey T. Ulmer et al., Does Increased Judicial Discretion Lead to Increased Disparity? The
“Liberation” of Judicial Sentencing Discretion in the Wake of the Booker/Fanfan Decision (Mar.
23, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1577238.
71 See, e.g., JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., MANDATORY MINIMUM DRUG SENTENCES:
THROWING AWAY THE KEY OR THE TAXPAYER’S MONEY? (1997); VINCENT & HOFER, supra
note 70, at 11-16; SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 33; Tonry, supra note 37, at 90-100; see also
UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE 6-7 (Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth eds.,
1993). To be clear, we are making a limited point here about the lack of unique deterrence from
mandatory minimum sentences, not from criminal penalties generally. Cf. Paul G. Cassell, In
Defense of the Death Penalty, in BEDAU & CASSELL, supra note 28, at 189-200 (discussing
evidence supporting a deterrent effect from capital sentences).
72 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2006):
Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a
sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect a
defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person
who has committed an offense.
See also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2010).
73 See Statistical Overview, supra note 35, at 131-32 (stating that 19.5% of federal defendants
subject to mandatory minimums were eligible for substantial assistance departures due to a
government motion, with 13.8% receiving the departure); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2008
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.27 [hereinafter 2008 SOURCEBOOK]
(reporting that 13.5% of all federal defendants received a substantial assistance departure). In
drug trafficking cases, where mandatory minimums are widely available, substantial assistance
departures were granted in 25.9% of cases in 2008. The rate was comparable or even higher,
however, in many types of cases without mandatory minimums: 79.2% in antitrust cases, 20% in
arson cases, 28% in bribery cases, 26.1% in civil rights cases, 28.6% in kidnapping cases, 25.9%
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of federal drug minimums are couriers, mules, and street-level dealers,
not kingpins or leaders in international drug cartels. 74
Despite this and other evidence, federal lawmakers—even those
who might like to eliminate some or all mandatory sentencing laws—
face a seemingly intractable problem in American democracy: the
dysfunctional relationship of politics and criminal justice. Some have
argued that Congress suffers from a sort of legislative schizophrenia on
sentencing reform. “One side is dispassionate and learned, deliberating
for decades in search of a rational, comprehensive solution. The other
is impulsive, reckless, driven by unquenchable political passions, and
impatient with its plodding alter-ego.” 75 When it comes to mandatory
minimums, federal lawmakers can both recognize their flaws and still
vote in their favor. 76
2.

Over-Criminalization

As a conceptual matter, congressional support for mandatory
minimums can be viewed as a troubling instance of a larger trend: overcriminalization and, more specifically, over-federalization. Overcriminalization refers to the continual expansion of criminal justice
systems, through the creation of novel crimes, harsher punishments,
broader culpability principles, and heightened enforcement, often in the
absence of moral or empirical justification and without regard for
statutory redundancy or jurisdictional limitations. 77
For decades, scholars have discussed the phenomenon and its
negative consequences, such as the greater potential for arbitrary
enforcement by police and prosecutors. In his 1967 critique, Sanford
Kadish warned that until over-criminalization is “systematically
examined and effectively dealt with, some of the most besetting
problems of criminal-law administration are bound to continue.” 78 In
in money laundering cases, 25.7% in racketeering/extortion cases, and 19.9% in tax cases. Id.;
see also Nachmanoff Testimony, supra note 37, at 15.
74 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 20-21, 85 (2007) [hereinafter COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING], available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/cocaine2007.pdf. Moreover, it has
been suggested that mandatory minimums may be counterproductive by producing a “cooperation
backlash,” where people may be less likely to report suspicious behavior or cooperate with law
enforcement out of concern that their neighbors may receive excessive punishment as a result.
See Schulhofer Testimony, supra note 37, at 16-18; see also infra notes 304-305 and
accompanying text.
75 Wallace, supra note 37, at 158.
76 See, e.g., Hatch, supra note 4, at 193.
77 See generally Luna, Overcriminalization, supra note 25.
78 Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 157 (1967); see also Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal
Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1963).
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the ensuing years, lawmakers have relentlessly added to American penal
codes, in the face of equally relentless criticisms by scholars and public
interest groups. 79
Much of this expansion has taken place at the state level, 80 but
arguably the most virulent form of over-criminalization—and certainly
the most criticized 81 —is in the federal system. Congress has slowly but
surely obtained a general police power to enact virtually any offense,
adopted repetitive and overlapping statutes, criminalized behavior that
is already well covered by state law, 82 created a vast web of regulatory
offenses, 83 and extended federal jurisdiction to almost any sort of
deception 84 or wrongdoing, 85 virtually anywhere in the world. 86 At last
count, there were about 4500 federal crimes on the books, 87 with the
largest portion enacted over the past four decades. 88

79
80

See, e.g., Luna, Overcriminalization, supra note 25, at 703-11, 712 nn.48-51.
See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of
American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633 (2005). But see, e.g., Darryl K. Brown,
Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223 (2007).
81 See, e.g., ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, REPORT OF THE ABA TASK FORCE ON THE
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 59-78 (1998) [hereinafter ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SECTION] (providing bibliography).
82 For instance, Congress enacted a “carjacking” statute that dealt with conduct fully
addressed by existing state crimes (e.g., robbery and kidnapping). See 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2006)
(imposing federal criminal liability on those who take motor vehicles by force, violence, or
intimidation and “with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm”); Commonwealth v.
Jones, 591 S.E.2d 68, 70 (Va. 2004) (detailing Virginia’s definition of robbery, which prohibits
the taking of any property of another by violence or intimidation); Spencer v. Commonwealth,
592 S.E.2d 400, 402 (Va. Ct. App. 2004) (“[C]arjacking is a species of robbery.”).
83 See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 663-64, 670-73 (1975). See generally Paul
Rosenzweig, The Over-Criminalization of Social and Economic Conduct, HERITAGE FOUND., 312 (Apr. 17, 2003), http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2003/pdf/lm7.pdf.
84 See 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (2006) (criminalizing false statements made pursuant to “any
matter” within any branch of the federal government); id. § 1341 (proscribing various fraudulent
transactions utilizing the Postal Service or private interstate mail carriers); id. § 1343 (prohibiting
similar fraudulent transactions over interstate wire, radio, and television signals); id. § 1346
(defining “scheme or artifice to defraud” under § 1341 and § 1343 as including a plan to “deprive
another of the intangible right to honest services”); see also Jeffrey Standen, An Economic
Perspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 249, 289 (1998) (citing
over three hundred federal proscriptions against fraud and misrepresentation).
85 See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1090-1103 (10th Cir. 2003) (upholding,
inter alia, a federal felony indictment for violation of Utah’s commercial bribery statute, a
misdemeanor under state law).
86 See, e.g., Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005) (affirming a defendant’s
federal conviction for violating Canadian tax law through the use of interstate wires); United
States v. McNab, 331 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003) (upholding federal conviction for violation of
Honduran fishing regulations); Ellen Podgor & Paul Rosenzweig, Bum Lobster Rap, WASH.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2004, at A14 (criticizing the McNab prosecution and noting that the Honduran
government believed that its laws had not been violated and had filed an amicus curiae brief in
support of the McNab defendants).
87 See John S. Baker, Jr., Revisiting the Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes, HERITAGE
FOUND. (June 16, 2008), http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2008/pdf/lm26.pdf.
88 See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, supra note 81, at 7.
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Like the growing opposition to mandatory minimums, overfederalization has been criticized by a broad band of organizations and
by politicians on both the left and the right. 89 Indeed, mandatory
minimums constitute a species of over-criminalization and overfederalization. 90 They are part of a punishment spree of unprecedented
proportions that, along with other obligatory sentencing schemes in the
states, have helped make America the single most punitive Western
nation and the world’s imprisonment leader. 91 Since 1980, for instance,
the federal prison population has increased tenfold, while the average
federal sentence has doubled and the average federal drug sentence has
tripled, due in no small part to mandatory minimums. 92
So what is the cause of over-criminalization, over-federalization,
and overly broad and harsh mandatory minimums? Some thirty years
after his original critique, Professor Kadish suggested a
commonsensical explanation for the “creeping and foolish federal
overcriminalization.”
Some dramatic crimes or series of crimes are given conspicuous
media coverage, producing what is perceived, and often is,
widespread public anxiety. Seeking to make political hay, some
legislator proposes a new law to make this or that a major felony or
to raise the penalty or otherwise tighten the screws. Since other
legislators know well that no one can lose voter popularity for
seeming to be tough on crime, the legislation sails through in a
breeze. That the chances of the legislation working to reduce crime
are exceedingly low, and in some cases the chances of it doing harm
are very high, scarcely seems to be a relevant issue. 93

89
90

See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Right and Left Join Forces, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2009, at A1.
See, e.g., Over-Criminalization of Conduct/Over-Federalization of Criminal Law: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 52-67 (2009) (statement of Stephen A. Saltzburg, American Bar
Association).
91 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, More Than 1 in 100 Adults Are Now in Prison in U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 29, 2008, at A14; Michael Tonry & David P. Farrington, Punishment and Crime Across
Space and Time, 33 CRIME & JUST. 1, 6 (2005); Alfred Blumstein et al., Cross-National
Measures of Punitiveness, 33 CRIME & JUST. 347 (2005); see also SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS
IN WESTERN COUNTRIES (Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase eds., 2001); JAMES Q. WHITMAN,
HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND
EUROPE (2003).
92 See, e.g., Heather C. West & William J. Sabol, Prisoners in 2007, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.
BULL. (U.S. Dep’t of Justice), Dec. 2008, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
p07.pdf; SOURCEBOOK 2003, supra note 24, at 519 tbl.6.57, available at
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t657.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF
GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM ch. 2 (2004); Paul J. Hofer &
Courtney Semisch, Examining Changes in Federal Sentence Severity: 1980-1998, 12 FED.
SENT’G REP. 12 (1999).
93 Sanford H. Kadish, Comment: The Folly of Overfederalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1247,
1248 (1995) [hereinafter Kadish, Overfederalization].

LUNA.CASSELL.32-1

2010]

9/13/2010 12:25:07 PM

MANDATORY MINIMALISM

23

Other scholars support this account, bolstered by the reports of
legal groups and former federal officials. 94 Sensationalistic news
coverage tends to increase the public salience of crime, generating fear
and attendant calls for action. 95 Even in areas where concern may be
unfounded, populist pressures create incentives for lawmakers to enact
new crimes and harsher punishments. Such legislation is readily
grasped by constituents, produces few opponents, permits the public to
vent its outrage, and most importantly, gives politicians the tough-oncrime credentials that can fill campaign coffers and garner votes at
election time. 96
As Professor Kadish mentioned, the process can be set off by a
string of crimes or even a single traumatic case that grabs news
headlines and the public imagination. These events may trigger what
social scientists have termed a “moral panic,” where intense outbursts of
emotion impede rational deliberation, lead individuals to overestimate a
perceived threat and to demonize a particular group, and generate a
public demand for swift and stern government action. 97 Although any
resulting legislation will almost certainly be touted for its instrumental
benefits, the law will serve as a symbolic gesture for politicians and

94 See, e.g., THE 2009 CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSITION COAL., SMART ON CRIME:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS 1-12, 30-74 (2008),
available at http://2009transition.org/criminaljustice/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_
download&gid=10&Itemid=; Rachel Brand, Making it a Federal Case: An Inside View of the
Pressures to Federalize Crime, HERITAGE FOUND., (Aug. 29, 2008), http://s3.amazonaws.com/
thf_media/2008/pdf/lm30.pdf; Edwin Meese III, The Dangerous Federalization of Crime, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 22, 1999, at A19. In the words of former U.S. Attorney General Ed Meese,
Because crime, particularly violent or street crime, concerns virtually every citizen,
congressional candidates and officeholders find such legislation politically popular.
Likewise, Congress frequently criminalizes crimes after notorious incidents that have
received extensive media attention. This type of “feel-good” legislation often causes
the public to feel that “something is being done” and creates the illusion of greater
crime control.
Id.
95 Professor Beale’s scholarship has been particularly enlightening on the influence of the
media (and other non-legal factors) on criminal justice policy. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The
News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How Market-Driven News Promotes
Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397 (2006); Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime?
Prospects for Restorative Justice in the United States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413 (2003) [hereinafter
Beale, Still Tough on Crime?]; Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do with It? The Political,
Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal)
Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23 (1997); see also Robert Reiner, Media-Made
Criminality: The Representation of Crime in the Mass Media, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CRIMINOLOGY 302 (Mike Maguire et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007); Luna, Public Imagination, supra
note 29.
96 See, e.g., Luna, Overcriminalization, supra note 25, at 719-24.
97 See, e.g., Luna, Public Imagination, supra note 29, at 81-85. See generally STANLEY
COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS: THE CREATION OF THE MODS AND ROCKERS (1972)
(articulating a theory of moral panics).
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their constituents, expressing condemnation of the relevant act and
actors. 98
3.

Application to Mandatory Minimums

This understanding of federal lawmaking helps explain the rise and
persistence of mandatory minimums. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted
that their enactment often does not involve “any careful consideration”
of the ultimate effects. Instead, mandatory minimums “are frequently
the result of floor amendments to demonstrate emphatically that
legislators want to ‘get tough on crime.’” 99 In fact, federal lawmakers
have explicitly used phrases like “tough on crime” in their support of
mandatory minimums, 100 with some of the most notorious sentencing
laws originating from symbolic politics.
Consider, for instance, the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) as part
of the Gun Control Act of 1968 (which itself was part of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968). The legislation was a
response to public fear over street crime, civil unrest, and the shooting
of Martin Luther King, Jr. The day after the assassination of Robert F.
Kennedy, § 924(c) was proposed as a floor amendment and passed that
same day with no congressional hearings or committee reports, only a
speech by the amendment’s sponsor about its catchphrase goal “to
persuade the man who is tempted to commit a federal felony to leave his
gun at home.” 101 Since then, Congress has amended § 924(c) several
times and converted it from a one-year mandatory minimum to one of
the nation’s most draconian punishment laws. 102
98 See, e.g., Erik Luna, The .22 Caliber Rorschach Test, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 53, 61-72 (2002)
[hereinafter Luna, Rorschach Test]; Luna, Principled Enforcement, supra note 29, at 537-40; cf.
JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN
TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (2d ed. 1986) (discussing the symbolic politics underlying alcohol
prohibition).
99 Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 287.
100 See, e.g., infra note 110 and accompanying text; Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design
and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 873
n.14 (2009) (quoting federal lawmakers).
101 See 114 CONG. REC. 22,231 (1968) (statement of Rep. Poff).
102 See Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 102, 82 Stat. 1213, 1223-24 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (2006)); Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, § 1005, 98 Stat. 2028, 2138 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); Firearms
Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(a), 100 Stat. 449, 459 (1986) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924); Act to Throttle Criminal Use of Guns, Pub. L. No. 105-386, §
1(a)(1), 112 Stat. 3469, 3469 (1998) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924); see also United
States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1233-35 (D. Utah 2004) (discussing legislative history
and judicial interpretation of § 924(c)); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW
THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF
FEAR (2007) (discussing background of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968).
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Another example comes from the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1986, 103 the law that instituted the crack/powder cocaine
sentencing differential and created the basic structure of federal
mandatory minimums for drug trafficking. A driving force behind these
provisions was the cocaine overdose of basketball star Len Bias, which
prompted a remarkable level of media attention and a moral panic about
crack cocaine. 104 The bill was pushed forward in a headlong, resultoriented surge, enacted without hearings or input from experts. 105 Some
lawmakers conceded that the legislation attempted to appease an
electorate that had become hysterical over an alleged epidemic of crack
cocaine, 106 which was fed in part by inflammatory claims about the
drug. 107
At the height of the Bias incident, a Washington Post editorial
gibed that in the prevailing can-you-top-this environment, “an
amendment to execute pushers only after flogging and hacking them”
might have been enacted by Congress. 108 “The problem is that we have
an epidemic,” one senator argued. 109 “We have an enemy. We talk
about a war [on drugs]. I love to use that term, because it sounds tough;
it makes good talk, good speeches.” 110 Ironically, it was later revealed

103 Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207; see, e.g., William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio:
Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1233, 1250-56 (1996).
104 See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. H6202 (daily ed. July 28, 2010) (statement of Rep. Dan
Lungren), 156 Cong Rec H6196-01, at *H6202 (Westlaw).
[A]s someone who helped to write the Drug Control Act of 1986 that we seek to
amend, I’d like to make a few observations to set the record straight. It is indeed true
that the death of basketball star Len Bias served as an exclamation point concerning the
threat posed to our Nation by the scourge of illegal drug use. The fact that someone
who seemed bigger than life could fall prey to the growing cocaine epidemic brought
home the reality of the danger to every home with a television set that had tuned into
the University of Maryland basketball games. And that reality was not lost on this
body.
Id.; see also 132 CONG. REC. S13741-01 (1986), 132 Cong Rec S13741-01 (Westlaw); MOLLY
M. GILL, CORRECTING COURSE: LESSONS FROM THE 1970 REPEAL OF MANDATORY MINIMUMS
18, 34 n.60 (2008), available at http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/8189_FAMM_BoggsAct
_final.pdf; Wallace, supra note 37, at 159 (quoting Rep. Robert Dornan).
105 “Much of the [standard] procedure was circumvented,” a former House staff member
recounted. “In essence, the careful, deliberate procedures of Congress were set aside in order to
expedite passage of the bill.” Eric E. Sterling, The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug Prohibition,
Politics and Reform, 40 VILL. L. REV. 383, 408 (1995); see also COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING, supra note 74, at 117; GILL, supra note 104, at 18, 34 n.61 (statement of Sen.
Mathias).
106 See, e.g., GILL, supra note 104, at 18, 34 nn.59-61.
107 See, e.g., id. at 18, 34 n.58 (quoting Sen. D’Amato and Sen. Chiles); see also id. at 34 n.66
(quoting Rep. Hunter).
108 Wallace, supra note 37, at 159 n.30.
109 132 CONG. REC. S13741-01 (1986), 132 Cong Rec S13741-01 (Westlaw) (statement of
Sen. DeConcini).
110 Id.
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that Bias died from ingesting powder cocaine, not crack. 111 But by
then, it did not matter.
The resulting inequities were ameliorated in part by the recent
crack cocaine law, including the elimination of the mandatory minimum
for simple possession. As mentioned, however, federal law still
maintains a sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine,
and the reform law itself called for new enhancements for all drugrelated crime. Moreover, the reforms that were achieved took nearly a
quarter-century to be enacted, despite, for instance, repeated attempts by
the U.S. Sentencing Commission to persuade lawmakers to eliminate
the crack/powder sentencing differential. 112
Law enforcement also has an interest in the expansion of criminal
justice. Although aspirational language may describe the prosecutorial
function as an impartial “minister of justice,” 113 there should be little
doubt that American prosecutors see themselves as advocates in a
sometimes brutally adversarial process. 114
The adversarial role
conception can be exacerbated by prosecutorial incentive structures,
where the success and career prospects of both lead and line prosecutors
are sometimes measured by the rate of convictions and the aggregate
amount of punishment. 115 For fairly obvious reasons, these motivations
111 See, e.g., Marc Mauer, The Disparity on Crack-Cocaine Sentencing, BOSTON GLOBE, July
5, 2006, at 7.
112 See, e.g., Gary Fields, Sentencing Guidelines Face New Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26,
2006, at A4 (“The commission has tried since 1995 to bring the penalties for crack crimes more
in line with powder cocaine but the Republican-controlled Congress has ignored past attempts.”).
For the Sentencing Commission’s opposition to the crack/powder sentencing differential, see U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING
POLICY 91 (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/02crack/2002crackrpt.pdf.
113 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2007).
114 See, e.g., ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW
61-96 (2001); see also Michael Asimow, Popular Culture and the Adversary System, 40 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 653 (2007); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Metaphors Matter: How Images of Battle,
Sports, and Sex Shape the Adversary System, 10 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 225 (1995); William T.
Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits of Comparative
Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325 (1993).
115 See, e.g., Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long, Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career
Objectives of Federal Prosecutors, 48 J.L. & ECON. 627 (2005); Richard T. Boylan, What do
Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence From the Careers of U.S. Attorneys, 7 AM. LAW & ECON. REV.
379 (2005); Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in
Criminal Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1599-1600 (2005) [hereinafter Brown, Decline of
Defense Counsel]; Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2463, 2470-76 (2004); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004
WIS. L. REV. 837, 902-03; MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY
IN AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 207 (2004) [hereinafter TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME];
Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of
Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 134-35 (2004); Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and
Prosecutorial Agenda Setting in United States Attorneys’ Offices: The Role of U.S. Attorneys and
Their Assistants, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 271 (2002); Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors
Maximize? An Analysis of the Federalization of Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 259
(2000); David T. Johnson, The Organization of Prosecution and the Possibility of Order, 32 LAW
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are served by over-criminalization: The more crimes on the books and
the harsher the punishments, the more power law enforcement can
exercise throughout the criminal process. 116
In the words of a former Justice Department official, “it is not
surprising that the federal agency charged with preventing, solving, and
punishing federal crimes is not aggressively attempting to shrink the
federal code.” 117 Of particular relevance here, the Justice Department
has frequently lobbied Congress for tougher sentences, including
mandatory minimums. 118
Again, this should not be surprising,
considering the incentive structure of federal prosecutors. With drastic
increases in potential punishment, sometimes by charging multiple
counts for a single course of conduct, defendants are given every reason
to cooperate with the prosecution by providing information, entering
into plea agreements, and waiving their constitutional rights. All of this
enhances the power of prosecutors, who can obtain more and cheaper
convictions via plea bargaining or, if that fails, deploy against their
opponents the potent weapon of unavoidable sentences.
Several years ago, a federal trial judge wrote about “the essential
key to an understanding of federal sentencing policy today.”
[The Justice] Department is so addicted to plea bargaining to
leverage its law enforcement resources to an overwhelming
& SOC’Y REV. 247 (1998); DAVID BURNHAM, ABOVE THE LAW: SECRET DEALS, POLITICAL
FIXES, AND OTHER MISADVENTURES OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1996); Tracey L.
Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with
Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851 (1995); Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the
Virtuous Prosecutor, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197 (1988). Moreover, many young attorneys stay in a
prosecutor’s office only for a few years, seeking to build their resumes and credentials as a means
to achieve a high-paying job in the private sector. See, e.g., TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME,
supra, at 208.
116 William Stuntz’s work has been especially insightful on these issues. See, e.g., Stuntz,
Pathological Politics, supra note 55; William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s
Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004); William J. Stuntz, The Political
Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780 (2006).
117 Brand, supra note 94, at 1-2.
118 See, e.g., Defending America’s Most Vulnerable: Safe Access to Drug Treatment and Child
Protection Act of 2004: Hearing on H.R. 4547 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 6 (2004) (statement of
Catherine M. O’Neil, Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen.), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/
cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_house_hearings&docid=f:94636.pdf (arguing in favor of
increased mandatory minimums for drug crimes, which allow the government to move
“effectively up the chain of supply using lesser distributors to prosecute larger dealers, leaders
and suppliers”); Drug Mandatory Minimums: Are They Working?: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform,
106th Cong. 62 (2000) (statement of John Roth, Chief, Narcotic & Dangerous Drug Section,
Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice) (stating that mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes
provide “an indispensable tool for prosecutors” to induce defendants to cooperate); see also
Barkow, supra note 100, at 880 (“Representatives from the Department of Justice and the various
United States Attorneys’ Offices often argue before Congress that legislation with inflated or
mandatory punishments should be passed or retained because those laws give prosecutors the
leverage they need to exact pleas and to obtain cooperation from defendants.”).
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conviction rate that the focus of our entire criminal justice system
has shifted far away from trials and juries and adjudication to a
massive system of sentence bargaining that is heavily rigged against
the accused citizen. 119

As a result, a fraction of federal cases go to trial—roughly 5%
since 2002—of which only a small percentage result in acquittal. In
other words, the prosecutor wins virtually every case he pursues. 120 The
threat or imposition of mandatory minimums helps ensure that the
prosecutor’s choice of punishment prevails in court. 121
II. REFORMING MANDATORY MINIMUMS
With this background, the question becomes how reform efforts
might be pursued. The courts provide one possible forum, particularly
since the judiciary is considered a primary safeguard against political
excesses, at least to the extent that the action in question raises serious
constitutional concerns. In the present context, extreme mandatory
sentences might conflict with the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of
“cruel and unusual punishment.” 122 Such a ruling could be based on a
relatively broad, liberal interpretation of constitutional judicial review,
where the courts vigorously scrutinize the punitive tendencies of the
political branches. A more sophisticated approach might rely upon,
inter alia, political process theory. 123 One might argue that the
dysfunctional politics of mandatory minimums renders them impervious
to the usual “channels of political change,” 124 for instance, or that the
laws result from prejudice against “discrete and insular minorities,”
which curtails the protections usually provided by the political
process. 125
In reality, however, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this area,
described by some as an abandonment of the field, makes clear that
judicial review will not provide much of a check on excessive
119 United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 265 (D. Mass. 2004). To be clear, the judge
was discussing prosecutorial behavior under the pre-Booker mandatory guidelines regime.
However, his words apply to mandatory minimums with equal, if not greater, force.
120 See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal
Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79 (2005).
121 Some defense attorneys claim that the threat of mandatory minimums is regularly used to
dissuade defendants from filing motions to suppress evidence, or to waive their rights to appeal
the sentence, attack it collaterally, move for resentencing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)
(2006), and forego arguments for a lower sentence under § 3553(a).
122 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
123 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).
124 Id. at 103.
125 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
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punishment. Except for death penalty cases, Eighth Amendment
challenges to criminal sentences are rarely successful. Much of the
judicial reluctance might be attributed to the lack of clear-cut standards
to assess when a term of imprisonment becomes unconstitutional: What
makes a sentence “cruel and unusual” anyway? 126 As a conceptual
matter, the requisite finding of gross disproportionality might be
informed by the punishments available elsewhere—asking whether the
present jurisdiction is out of line with the others and, if so, by how
much—an inquiry that would seem to have at least some basis for
objectivity. 127 But as a matter of contemporary practice, only one
Supreme Court decision and a handful of lower court decisions have
ever invalidated an adult prison term as cruel and unusual
punishment. 128 This means that significant reform will come, if at all,
by Congress.
This presents quite a challenge for the very body that created
mandatory minimums to begin with and maintained them despite
evidence of ineffectiveness and abuse. Federal lawmakers have often
struggled with the more general problem of how to save Congress from
itself and prevent the passage of foolish and harmful laws. When all is
said and done, however, “the principal protector against bad laws is the
political branches themselves,” Justice Elena Kagan argued during her
recent confirmation hearing. 129 With this in mind, the following
considers whether the long-standing adherence to mandatory minimums
might change under the right conditions, with Congress itself remedying
the injustices of obligatory punishment.
A.

Behavioral Science and Mandatory Minimums

As seen in the previous Part, mandatory minimums provide a
fascinating (though disquieting) case study on the influences and
incentives in political decision-making on issues of criminal justice. To
a large extent, official support for mandatory minimums is compatible
126 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998-1000 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also
infra notes 193-194 and accompanying text (discussing the “countermajoritarian difficulty”).
127 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23-24 (2003); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy,
J., concurring); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).
128 See Solem, 463 U.S. 277 (striking down non-violent recidivist’s sentence of life
imprisonment without possibility of parole for uttering “no account” check); Ramirez v. Castro,
365 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2004) (striking down defendant’s 25-years-to-life sentence for his third
shoplifting offense); see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010) (striking down juvenile
offender’s sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole).
129 Continuation of the Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010), 2010
WLNR 13149042; see also Adam Liptak, Kagan Reminds Senators: Legislation is Your Job,
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2010, at A16.
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with the rational choice model of microeconomics and its assumption of
methodological individualism. This model maintains that individuals
are the only relevant agents of human behavior, where “man is a
rational maximizer of his ends in life,” that is, his self-interest. 130 The
application of economic principles to politics—typically referred to as
public choice theory—leads to a number of somber conclusions about
the self-interested behavior of politicians and the uninformed nature of
the electorate. 131
Although criminal justice issues may not (ordinarily) implicate
political manipulations like “log-rolling” and “rent-seeking,” decisionmaking about mandatory minimums does seem to follow the rational
actor assumption. As just discussed, lawmakers can appear tough on
crime and can mollify fits of public anxiety by enacting harsh
sentencing provisions, which also serve the interests of law enforcers by
increasing their plea-bargaining leverage and thus the rate and amount
of convictions. While the passage of mandatory minimums can enhance
a representative’s prospects for reelection, efforts to reform such laws
may be perceived as a political liability, allowing an opponent to assail
the incumbent as being soft on crime.
To be sure, politicians may genuinely believe in the case for
mandatory minimums, regardless of evidence undermining the principal
arguments. Research in cognitive psychology suggests that individuals
experience intellectual boundaries that systematically impede rational
decision-making. 132
People adopt rules of thumb to deal with
unmanageable or incomplete information, and their decisions can be
shaped by subtle but powerful prejudices. Although wholly speculative,
one could imagine how various biases and heuristics may impact the
decisions politicians make about mandatory minimums. Consider, for
instance, the following:
• An official might overestimate the necessity of harsh punishment, based
on a less-than-rigorous case analogy or the mental availability of a highprofile incident that would seem to call for a mandatory sentence. 133
130 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (7th ed. 2007); see also GARY S.
BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976).
131
See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT (1962); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).
132 See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1477 (1998); Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive
Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 748 (1990). See generally JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY].
133 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1188-90
(1997) [hereinafter Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis] (discussing availability and case-based
heuristics); see also Jolls et al., supra note 132, at 1518-20; Cass R. Sunstein, Selective Fatalism,
27 J. LEGAL STUD. 799, 806 (1998) [hereinafter Sunstein, Selective Fatalism]; Timur Kuran &
Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999);
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• Government actors may be unrealistically optimistic about the ability of
such laws to reduce crime or prevent future tragedies, preferring the
strictness of a mandatory minimum that supposedly eliminates all risk of
further offending, rather than a more nuanced and economically sensible
option that reduces, but does not eliminate, the perceived danger. 134
• Once adopted, official positions on a mandatory minimum may be
difficult to change, even when confronted with new information and
experiences. Politicians may simply alter their attitudes and beliefs to
minimize any dissonance between the goals of mandatory sentencing and
the law’s actual effects. 135
• Moreover, the sentencing status quo might be seen as preferable, if not
inevitable, 136 while the perceived costs of eliminating mandatory
minimums may appear ominous and far greater than any benefits,
particularly if the costs (e.g., reduced prosecutorial leverage) will accrue
sooner than the benefits (e.g., lower prison expenses). 137

JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 132, at 11-14, 163-208; Itzhak Gilboa & David
Schmeidler, Case-Based Decision Theory, 110 Q.J. ECON. 605 (1995).
134 See, e.g., Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis, supra note 133, at 1182-84, 1191 (discussing
over-optimism, certainty, and ambiguity); see also Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis
of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1658-63 (1998); Jennifer Arlen, The
Future of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1773-75 (1998); Sunstein,
Selective Fatalism, supra note 133, at 807-09; Neil D. Weinstein, Optimistic Biases About
Personal Risks, 246 SCIENCE 1232 (1989); Craig R. Fox & Amos Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion
and Comparative Ignorance, 110 Q.J. ECON. 585 (1995).
135 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
1129, 1146-47 (1986) (discussing cognitive dissonance). See generally ELLIOT ARONSON, THE
SOCIAL ANIMAL (7th ed. 1995); JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES (1983); LEON FESTINGER, A
THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
136 See, e.g., Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis, supra note 133, at 1185, 1191-92 (discussing
hindsight and status quo biases); see also Sunstein, Selective Fatalism, supra note 133, at 809;
Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608
(1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate
Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347,
359-62 (1996); William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making,
1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988).
137 See, e.g., Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis, supra note 133, at 1179-81, 1184-85, 1193-94
(discussing endowment effect, loss aversion, inter-temporal utility bias, and hindsight bias); see
also Arlen, supra note 134, at 1771-72; Colin Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in THE
HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 587, 665-70 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds.,
1995); RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF
ECONOMIC LIFE 63-78 (1992); RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1991);
Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias,
5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 203 (1991); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263,
274-89 (1979); Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption, in THE
RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1996); Jolls et
al., supra note 132, at 1538-41; David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112
Q.J. ECON. 443 (1997); George Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Intertemporal Choice, in
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• If a mistake is to be made—comparing the potential costs and benefits
from repealing mandatory minimums versus retaining them—lawmakers
may well prefer the error of omission and keep the laws on the books. 138

The history of federal crack cocaine law exemplifies some of these
concerns. As mentioned, the original legislation was propelled forward
by a single tragic case, the death of Len Bias. The quarter century of
congressional inaction that followed, in the face of new empirical
evidence and calls for change, demonstrated a collective risk aversion
and status quo bias, consistent with the conventional wisdom on harsh
punishment. As Rep. Smith put it, “Why do we want to risk another
surge of addiction and violence by reducing penalties?” 139 In general,
conscientious lawmakers might agree that mandatory minimums can
produce injustices in particular cases and yet balk at explicit legislative
repeal or any large-scale reforms.
A broader understanding of the rise and persistence of mandatory
minimums would also take into consideration powerful social
influences on individual behavior. Sociological theory teaches us that
humans may be moved by more than their economic self-interests; they
may act in pursuit of social status, for instance, and they may be guided
or inhibited by conventions, customs, habits, ideas, attitudes, and so
on. 140 These “social norms” can be both descriptive (i.e., what most
people do) and prescriptive (i.e., what people ought to do); 141 they can
be effected by appreciation of duty, desire for social approval, or fear of
reprobation; 142 and they may be shared by a peer group, a community, a
geographic region, or even an entire nation.

RESEARCH ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: CURRENTS, CONNECTIONS, AND
CONTROVERSIES 365 (William M. Goldstein & Robin M. Hogarth eds., 1997).
138 See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision
Making, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 583, 589-94 (2003) (discussing omission bias); see also Sunstein,
Behavioral Analysis, supra note 133, at 1180 n.22; Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Reluctance to
Vaccinate: Omission Bias and Ambiguity, 3 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 263 (1990).
139 156 CONG. REC. H6197 (daily ed. July 28, 2010) (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith), 156
Cong Rec H6196-01, at *H6197 (Westlaw).
140 See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1253, 1255 (1999); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms,
96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 350-52 (1997) [hereinafter McAdams, Regulation of Norms]; Cass R.
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 914 (1996) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Social Norms]; Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Efficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1697, 1699 (1996); Dennis Chong, Values Versus Interests in the Explanation of Social
Conflict, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2079, 2079 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social
Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 128-31 (1991).
141 See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 587
(1998).
142 See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947, 95557 (1997); Richard H. McAdams, Comment: Accounting for Norms, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 625, 63435.
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For present purposes, social norms can be defined as a group’s
expectations of its members, in terms of their attitudes and conduct,
producing generally followed, non-legal obligations backed by informal
sanctions. 143 They represent an important constraint on individual
behavior, particularly when one’s peer group generates the norm. As
social animals, humans naturally seek the affection and respect of those
people who are most significant in their lives. 144 An individual adopts
the group’s norms in pursuit of social acceptance, with his perception of
peer beliefs, values, and conduct thereby influencing his own actions.145
Social norms can also serve as a signaling device, where an individual
may behave consistent with a norm to indicate that he is a “good type”
of person, someone with whom others would want to associate and
cooperate. 146
When the relevant act is political, it can symbolize a group’s
perspective, enhance the members’ status, and affirm their particular
worldview. 147 As suggested above, mandatory minimums are pervaded
by symbolism. This is nothing new—criminal law has historically been
used to legitimize prevailing norms, delineating the “ins” from the
“outs” in a political community and providing a basis for social
cohesion. Moreover, a symbolic act and the resulting divide between
groups, even if failing to modify conduct directly, can have political
consequences.
For instance, a person’s reaction to an official gesture often
indicates (correctly or incorrectly) his traits, ethics, and lifestyle. For
the politician, a vote for mandatory minimums can signal that he is
tough on crime, an advocate of law-and-order policies, a friend of the
law-abiding community, a foe of social deviants, and a team player with
like-minded officials. In contrast, a politician’s failure to endorse harsh
sentencing laws may be perceived by others as opposition to (or at least
insufficient deference for) the underlying anti-crime symbol.
All told, the politics of mandatory minimums may involve a
confluence of economic, sociological, and psychological phenomena.
Moreover, the continued support for these laws has itself become a type
of norm for federal officials, both as a positive description and as a
matter of expectations. Congress not only enacts and maintains
mandatory minimums, but its members seem to believe that they ought

143 See, e.g., Luna, Institutional Design, supra note 29, at 199-200; Richard A. Posner, Social
Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 365, 365 (1997).
144 See, e.g., McAdams, Regulation of Norms, supra note 140, at 355-75.
145 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L.
REV. 349, 350-53 (1997); Luna, Institutional Design, supra note 29, at 200.
146 See, e.g., ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).
147 See supra note 98 and accompany text.
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to support such laws. 148 This norm is “sticky” to the point of near
reflexivity for some lawmakers, who might be resilient to new
information about the negative consequences of mandatory minimums
and therefore unlikely to engage in a meaningful reexamination of the
laws or consideration of the alternatives.
B.

Theories of Change

Although for years the laws and supporting arguments have been
imbedded in political agendas, several factors make the prospects for
change somewhat less daunting.
Because public opposition to
mandatory minimums appears to be growing—consistent with the
opinion of virtually all criminal justice scholars and policy analysts, and
an increasing number of commentators and officials—careful reforms
would neither fly in the face of legal and empirical studies nor be met
by uniform hostility from pundits and the populace. Moreover, such
reform efforts may be bolstered by three considerations: (1) some norms
may be more amenable to change through small moves than sweeping
transformations; (2) small changes to a social norm can have rapid and
dramatic effects; and (3) politicians can be agents of change for reasons
other than self-interest.
1.

The Value of Small Moves

Social norms have a stabilizing function for interpersonal
relationships, providing conventions for individual behavior and a ready
means to assess the bona fides of others. When the norms generally
result in appropriate judgments (at least as measured by some external
standard like economic efficiency), individuals may act without
constantly reassessing the propriety of that behavior. Instead, they may
focus their attention on more significant, complex, or rare issues. 149 As
just noted, however, some social norms may persist well after they have
been disputed by empirical studies and denounced by scholars and
policy analysts. This stickiness makes it difficult to alter beliefs and
attendant behaviors, despite good reasons to do so. People may
continue to abide by an obsolete norm regardless of its inefficiency or

148 Cf. Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1523-26
(2008).
149 See, e.g., Amitai Aviram & Avishalom Tor, Overcoming Impediments to Information
Sharing, 55 ALA. L. REV. 231, 250-51 (2004).
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immorality, sometimes out of habit but also due to lingering fears of
social disapproval. 150
Several years ago, Dan Kahan explored the problem of sticky
norms in the context of enforcing socially contested crimes. 151 Where
society is divided over the wrongfulness of the underlying conduct,
criminal justice decision-makers may be ambivalent toward the crime
and attached penalty but nonetheless willing to apply the law based on
their desire to carry out their legal duties. However, if lawmakers
determine that the behavior is not only wrongful but merits greater
condemnation, a substantial increase in punishment may have a
perverse effect in practice. “[T]he decisionmaker’s personal aversion to
condemning too severely will dominate her inclination to enforce the
law,” and her unwillingness “will strengthen the resistance of other
decisionmakers, whose reluctance will steel the resolve of still others,
triggering a self-reinforcing wave of resistance.” 152
A legislative “hard shove,” as Professor Kahan calls it, might only
entrench the norm that lawmakers were seeking to change. Statutory
reforms intended to crack down on socially contested criminal behavior
may be nullified by the case-based decisions of police, prosecutors, and
courts. 153 In contrast, if lawmakers make only incremental changes in
condemnation through a “gentle nudge” of criminal liability, criminal
justice actors may apply the new law consistent with their civic duties,
and by doing so, strengthen the predisposition of their colleagues to
enforce the law. 154 Although Kahan focuses on legislative expansions
of liability, this basic pattern can be seen in other areas as well. 155 More
150 See, e.g., id. at 251-52; see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1537 (2000).
151 See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67
U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000) [hereinafter Kahan, Gentle Nudges].
152 Id. at 608.
153 As examples, Professor Kahan discusses statutory changes concerning date rape, domestic
violence, and drunk driving. See id. at 608-09, 623-25, 628-31, 633-34; see also Dan M. Kahan,
Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases,
158 U. PENN. L. REV. 729 (2010) (employing cultural cognition theory to examine debate over
rape law reform).
154 According to Professor Kahan, the incremental transformation of anti-drug laws in the
early twentieth century from a taxation and orderly marketing scheme to an outright prohibition
provides an example of how an initial legislative nudge can lead to major changes in the criminal
justice system. See Kahan, Gentle Nudges, supra note 151, at 631-33.
155 For instance, successful litigation strategies may pursue incremental changes to legal
decisions that embody and even protect problematic social norms. While a comprehensive frontal
assault at the outset might only reaffirm anachronistic case law, small challenges that draw upon
shared experiences and principles may, over time, lead a court to reevaluate the norm and
eventually reject its prior decision. The best example is provided by the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund’s brilliant litigation strategy to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson and the Jim Crow system of the
South, culminating in the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education and its
progeny. See generally ROBERT J. COTTROL ET AL., BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: CASTE,
CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003); JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY (2001); MARK V.
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importantly, there is no theoretical barrier to applying the concept to
moderations of criminal liability.
2.

The Nature of Tipping Points

This leads into the second point: Small changes to a social norm
can have rapid and dramatic effects. The basic idea draws upon
epidemiological models of disease transmission and sociological
theories on the propagation of ideas and social customs. When a
“tipping point” is reached—more or less, a threshold of affected
individuals—a virus will spread at a nonlinear rate and an innovation or
norm will be adopted suddenly by a large number of people. The
impetus for this type of movement, what makes something tip, can be a
relatively marginal change. In the mid-1950s, sociologist Morton
Grodzins coined the term tipping point in suggesting that when a
community’s minority population reaches a certain percentage, most
white residents will leave the neighborhood. 156 In the following years,
scholars, policymakers, and jurists discussed this issue of “white flight”
and debated the validity of measures enacted to prevent neighborhoods
from tipping. 157
Although racial segregation has been a primary topic, tipping point
analysis applies to all sorts of trends, from fads of fashion and restaurant
popularity to crime rates and the incidence of suicide. When a
sufficient number of individuals are behaving in a particular way—what
economist Thomas Schelling described as a “critical mass” 158 —large
groups of people may suddenly adopt that behavior. In 2000, author
Malcolm Gladwell popularized the tipping point in his best-selling book
of the same name, applying the concept to a wide and seemingly
disparate variety of social phenomena that nonetheless follow a similar
pattern. 159 “Ideas and products and messages and behaviors spread like
viruses do.” 160 Because behavior is contagious, Gladwell argues, little
TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950
(1987); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975).
156 See Morton Grodzins, Metropolitan Segregation, SCI. AM., Oct. 1957, at 24.
157 See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Integration Maintenance: The Unconstitutionality of Benign
Programs that Discourage Black Entry to Prevent White Flight, 1981 DUKE L.J. 891; Bruce
Ackerman, Integration for Subsidized Housing and the Question of Racial Occupancy Controls,
26 STAN. L. REV. 245 (1974); Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974); Otero
v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
158 See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 94 (1978).
159 MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG
DIFFERENCE (2000).
160 Id. at 6. Gladwell’s examples include the surprising popularity of Hush Puppies and the
precipitous decline in violent crime in New York City. Id. at 1-9, 19-22, 133-51.
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changes can have huge effects and social epidemics can be triggered at a
single dramatic moment.
Scholars have characterized these types of rapid changes as
“bandwagon,” “snowball,” and “cascade” effects, all of which might
help explain remarkable shifts in social norms. 161 Once again, norms
may be so entrenched that they remain in effect well beyond their
usefulness, even if they are recognized as dysfunctional or immoral.
These norms might maintain only a thin, uninformed allegiance,
however, making them susceptible to swift change once a tipping point
is reached. An “informational cascade” may occur when a critical mass
of people begin to act in a particular way, signaling to others that the
behavior is well informed and appropriate under the circumstances. 162
In a similar manner, if a sufficient number of individuals appear to
endorse a belief through their words and deeds, people may join a
“reputational cascade” in order to curry the favor of others or avoid their
censure. 163 Small shifts in social norms can thus produce large, rapid
changes as more and more people alter their views and behaviors. 164
Any number of events might provide an exogenous shock that
pushes a norm to a tipping point—like a natural disaster or, as
mentioned earlier, a horrifying crime or series of crimes 165 —generating
a cascade throughout a population. But oftentimes change is only
possible through the facilitation of specific types of individuals,
variously known as “change agents,” “opinion leaders,” and “norm
entrepreneurs,” whose native abilities and social positions can
encourage others to adopt a new norm. 166 They may have extensive and
diverse personal relationships that allow the rapid spread of new ideas.
They may have knowledge about a vast array of issues or a technical
expertise that gives credibility to the information and opinions they
161 See generally Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 133; TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS,
PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION 250-60 (1995);
David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Informational
Cascades, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 188 (Mariano Tommasi & Kathyrn
Ierulli eds., 1995); Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural
Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992 (1992); Harvey Leibenstein,
Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers’ Demand, 64 Q.J. ECON. 183
(1950); Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 140; SCHELLING, supra note 158.
162 See, e.g., Bikhchandani et al., supra note 161, at 994.
163 Scholars have pointed to myriad examples of norm cascades in effect, including sociopolitical revolutions like the sudden demise of European communism some two decades ago.
See, e.g., Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 133, at 685-87.
164 See, e.g., KURAN, supra note 161, at 261-88; Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 140, at
929-30; Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 133.
165 See, e.g., supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text; Robert C. Ellickson, The Evolution of
Social Norms: A Perspective From the Legal Academy, in SOCIAL NORMS 49-51 (Michael
Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001).
166 See, e.g., EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 26-27 (4th ed. 1995);
Ellickson, supra note 165, at 51-52; Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 140, at 909, 929-30;
GLADWELL, supra note 159, at 30-74.
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provide. They may be especially convincing in their arguments and
possess a high “social intelligence” 167 that lets them recognize the value
of change. Or they may have a combination of these and other
attributes.
3.

The Existence of Statesmen

Which brings us to the third point: Politicians can be change agents
and may act for reasons other than self-interest. Some of the most
successful political actors recognize the problems with specific norms
and have the ability to persuade others to adopt new ones. As Cass
Sunstein notes, these actors “can exploit widespread dissatisfaction with
existing norms by (a) signaling their own commitment to change, (b)
creating coalitions, (c) making defiance of the norms seem or be less
costly, and (d) making compliance with new norms seem or be more
beneficial.” 168 Especially talented political leaders will use their
communication skills to bring attention to issues, and even to reframe
them in a way that resonates with their audience, changing how the
underlying norms are viewed. Of course, politicians may seek to
change a social norm to serve their own self-interests, as predicted by
public choice theory. Worse yet, they may appeal to prejudice and base
emotions, their demagoguery inflaming the public to support change
that might otherwise be rejected as unjustifiable.
What is interesting is not that lawmakers may use their political
skills toward their own ends, however, but that history is marked by
officials who have disregarded or downplayed their self-interests to do
what is best for society. Often referred to as “statesmen” (or
“stateswomen”), they take positions that could be perceived as
unpopular and politically dangerous, and then seek to change the views
of others through sensible lines of reasoning supported by reliable
evidence. 169 “What the statesman is most anxious to produce,”
Aristotle opined, “is a certain moral character in his fellow citizens,
namely, a disposition to virtue and the performance of virtuous
actions.” 170 Compared to other politicians, this type of leader is less
self-centered or short-sighted in his decision-making process and
ultimate judgments. Rather than acting solely for future elections and

167
168
169

See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 165, at 45.
Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 140, at 929.
See, e.g., Charles Rowley’s Blog, http://charlesrowley.wordpress.com/2010/01/15/thestatesman (Jan. 15, 2010, 09:41 EST).
170 THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 31 (J.A.K. Thomson ed., 1953).
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partisan victories, he is interested in the success of the nation and the
welfare of subsequent generations. 171
The statesman thus demonstrates what has been described as
“bounded self-interest.” 172 Studies suggest that people are concerned
about fairness and the well-being of others, including those with whom
they have no intimate or personal contact; and their political choices
may be purely altruistic and in pursuit of collective aspirations. 173 To
some, this behavior might demonstrate the limits of the rationality
assumption, with individuals sometimes contravening their own
economic self-interests and acting “nicer . . . than the agents postulated
by neoclassical theory.” 174 Others might argue that, in microeconomic
terms, these individuals’ utility functions place a stronger emphasis on
the pursuit of truth and doing what they believe is right, for example,
and might include genuine concerns about the legacies they leave. 175
By either explanation, however, the statesman defies cynical
expectations, going beyond what is perceived to be in his own narrowly
drawn political self-interests, and in doing so, encouraging his
colleagues to do the same.
C.

Application and Limitations

Together, these points offer a vision of how mandatory minimums
might be reformed. For the reasons discussed in the previous Part, a bill
that explicitly and completely purges mandatory sentences from the
federal system is likely to be a political nonstarter in Congress. In
contrast, a modest proposal that draws upon common principles and
values may be less likely to provoke soft-on-crime anxieties among
lawmakers or a backlash from federal prosecutors. 176 In other words,
this type of limited reform offers a gentle nudge toward a new norm that
challenges the propriety of excessive punishment. A congressional
statesman might forward the proposal, persuading his colleagues and
171 Cf. THE NEW DICTIONARY OF THOUGHTS: A CYCLOPEDIA OF QUOTATIONS 476 (C.N.
Catrevas & Jonathan Edwards eds., Standard Book Company 1944) (1877) (“A politician thinks
of the next election; a statesman of the next generation. A politician looks for the success of his
party; a statesman for that of his country. The statesman wishes to steer, while the politician is
satisfied to drift.” (quoting nineteenth-century theologian and scholar James Freeman Clarke)).
172 See Jolls et al., supra note 132, at 1479.
173 See, e.g., id.; Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 140, at 960; see also Joseph Henrich et
al., In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 91 AM.
ECON. REV. 73 (2001); Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the
New Behavioral Law and Economics Movement, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 973, 979 (2000).
174 Jolls et al., supra note 132, at 1479.
175 See, e.g., Charles Rowley’s Blog, supra note 169.
176 Such values may be akin to law enforcement’s general desire to enforce the law and fulfill
it civic obligations. See supra text accompanying notes 151-53.

LUNA.CASSELL.32-1

40

9/13/2010 12:25:07 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:1

constituents through sound arguments about the ineffectiveness of
mandatory minimums, the glaring injustices they produce, and the
minimal nature of the reform itself.
As in the past, supporters may have to contend with the
conventional wisdom about the pro-punishment politics of criminal
justice. The task might be far less difficult than assumed, however,
given the potentially tenuous hold of the long-standing norm favoring
harsh punishment. In fact, this norm might be reaching a tipping point,
as evidenced by growing opposition to mandatory minimums among the
public and political class. If so, a small reform backed by an influential
change agent might trigger an informational and reputational cascade in
Congress, with more and more representatives hopping on the
bandwagon in support of the proposal. If the initial change proves
successful, other reforms might follow as officials come to embrace a
new norm regarding crime and punishment.
Admittedly, this is only a theory of how the process might take
place. Such speculation is largely unavoidable considering the dearth of
congressional reductions in criminal liability. Not unlike the new crack
cocaine law, however, earlier reforms were enacted in a tough-on-crime
political environment. Largely due to a moral panic about drugs,
Congress passed the Boggs Act of 1951, 177 which imposed a series of
harsh mandatory minimums for federal drug crime. 178 A decade and a
half later, Richard Nixon swept into office on an anti-crime platform,
including a call for tougher punishment, echoed by federal
lawmakers. 179 But in the first year of his administration, President
Nixon changed course and suggested that severe sentences were not the
inevitable solution to America’s crime problems.
Bolstered by conservative proponents, Congress sought to
eliminate almost all mandatory minimum penalties as part of a
comprehensive drug reform bill. 180 Lawmakers argued that mandatory
sentences were “inconsistent, illogical, and unduly severe in some
cases,” and had “little or no deterrent value.” 181 Speaking in favor of
the proposed law, then-Congressman George H.W. Bush made the
following comments on the House floor:
Contrary to what one might imagine, [a repeal of mandatory
minimums] will result in better justice and more appropriate

177 Pub. L. No. 82-235, 65 Stat. 767 (1951) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 174)
(repealed 1970); see, e.g., GILL, supra note 104, at 12-17.
178 See, e.g., Wallace, supra note 37.
179 See, e.g., Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56
STAN L. REV. 1211, 1265-66 (2004) [hereinafter Miller, Domination].
180 See, e.g., id. at 1267. See generally Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 801
(2006)).
181 116 CONG. REC. 33,313-14 (1970) (statement of Rep. Beall).
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sentences. For one thing, Federal judges are almost unanimously
opposed to mandatory minimums, because they remove a great deal
of the court’s discretion. . . . As a result [of this bill], we will
undoubtedly have more equitable action by the courts, with actually
more convictions where they are called for, and fewer
disproportionate sentences. Mr. Chairman, these penal reforms have
been a long time in coming. Now that we have them, let us not delay
in moving them to the President’s desk. 182

Ultimately signed by President Nixon, the law attempted to address
criticisms of mandatory sentencing that sound eerily similar to those
heard today, forty years later.
Mandatory minimums remain sticky, as suggested by decades
without repeal and the quarter-century resilience of the crack/powder
cocaine differentials in mandatory sentencing. But while attempts to
completely eliminate the later disparity were unsuccessful, more modest
changes were enacted with widespread support that crossed political
lines, including a unanimous vote in the Senate. 183 So although an
across-the-board elimination of mandatory minimums may be
impracticable today, this history seems to suggest that it is not
altogether impossible to achieve some measure of reform. A moderate,
principled proposal, supported by influential political actors, might
receive bipartisan support and set the stage for further change.
Some important caveats should be mentioned about the premises of
this undertaking, however. To begin with, the behavioral sciences have
no normative agenda. They cannot tell you what is right or good, only
what is and what could be. “Social meaning does no work on its own,”
philosopher Martha Nussbaum notes. 184 Instead, “it offers an invitation
to normative moral and political philosophy.” 185 This invitation
presents both conceptual and practical perils for those who wish to use
economic, sociological, and psychological theories in pursuit of a
particular end. The fact that we can regulate social norms or respond to
biases and heuristics to support government action does not imply that
we ought to do so. It can be argued that such interference is inherently
illiberal, a newfangled social engineering that manipulates its audience
toward particular choices, in service of the engineer’s own conception
of the good. 186 Wielded by government, the tools of the behavioral
sciences are available to both the benevolent and the exploitative.
182
183
184

Bush Speech, supra note 3.
See, e.g., supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text.
Martha Nussbaum, “Whether from Reason or Prejudice”: Taking Money for Bodily
Services, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 693, 696 (1998); see also Russell Hardin, Magic on the Frontier:
The Norm of Efficiency, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1987, 2014 (1996); Lessig, supra note 140, at 1101;
Kahan, Gentle Nudges, supra note 151, at 640-41.
185 Nussbaum, supra note 184, at 696.
186 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 140, at 1016-19; Posner, supra note 143, at 367; see also Tibor
Machan, The Scope of Public Choice Theory, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM FOUND. (Sept. 1, 2008),
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Besides the “darker side” 187 to this enterprise, there are questions
as to whether behavioral insights can be effectively harnessed to serve a
particular goal, or whether attempts at norm management might
backfire and only make things worse. Scholars who have utilized these
insights have been criticized for, among other things, an alleged lack of
scientific rigor, the manipulation of ambiguous terms, the absence of a
distinct analytical methodology, the exploitation of anecdotes and trivial
findings, the facile logic of policy prescriptions, and the inattention to
moral and constitutional theory. 188
We do not mean to enter into this important debate here. Instead,
drawing upon theories of economics, sociology, and psychology, we
sought an explanation for the enactment and retention of mandatory
minimums, which exist today despite empirical refutation and growing
public and political opposition. The behavioral sciences offer such an
account, but we do not deny that some other story might fit just as well.
We also try to provide a plausible understanding of how reform might
take place given current conditions (or at least perceptions thereof).
Most importantly, we are not trying to modify the preferences and
behaviors of the general public. Instead, the ultimate target is the
people’s representatives, in the hope that lawmakers will do what is
supported by research, legal and moral analysis, and the people
themselves. For this reason, we believe that the posited process is not
only conceivable as a descriptive matter, but also normatively justified.
If it turns out that our understanding of the relevant facts and
values is incorrect, then the process and its conclusions are also flawed
and may well be irrelevant. This discussion is moot, for instance, if it
turns out that the opposition to mandatory minimums is so
overwhelming, categorical, and politically effective that it forces
lawmakers to immediately eliminate the laws in one fell swoop.
Conversely, if the perceived opposition turns out to be illusory or weak,
a key predicate is absent and the likelihood of reform substantially
undermined. And if the public and political class believe that
mandatory minimums are an unmitigated good, well, this entire project
is simply wrongheaded and a nonstarter from the outset. But if the
opposition is real and growing and normatively justified, and if reform

http://www.fff.org/comment/com0809a.pdf; The New Chicago School: Myth or Reality?, 5 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 20-22, 26 (1998) (comments of Richard Epstein); Edna UllmannMargalit, Revision of Norms, 100 ETHICS 756, 764 (1990).
187 See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 691 (1998).
188 For critiques of social norms scholarship, see, for example, Robert Weisberg, Norms and
Criminal Law, and the Norms of Criminal Law Scholarship, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 467
(2003); Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 1363 (2000); Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms,
86 VA. L. REV. 1603 (2000); Mark Tushnet, “Everything Old Is New Again”: Early Reflections
on the “New Chicago School,” 1998 WIS. L. REV. 579 (1998).
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efforts are currently inhibited by a sticky but fragile norm among
federal lawmakers, the process we describe might provide a reasonable
means of change. What is more, the initial minimalist proposal
discussed below will have beneficial effects in and of itself, even if it
does not generate further reforms.
In the following pages, we will not engage in the perilous task of
naming potential norm entrepreneurs in Congress, except to say that we
are confident that such statesmen and stateswoman exist. Nor will we
offer suggestions on how to promote reform in the media and halls of
Congress, other than to describe those principles that inform our
specific proposal. The difficult questions of public relations are best
left to interested organizations and the lawmakers themselves. Instead,
we will focus on an overarching theory of minimalist reform, the
principles that could inform such efforts and provide grounds for
consensus, and a specific legislative proposal that could achieve the
reform objectives.
III. MINIMALISM
The idea of minimalism has been a topic of debate in both political
philosophy and legal theory, motivated by the very nature of liberal
society and its institutions. As a philosophical question, how can
governments that anticipate, protect, and even encourage diverse
worldviews nonetheless ensure stability, harmony, and sound public
policy? Liberal constitutional democracies like the United States are
often composed of a citizenry profoundly divided by incompatible, even
incommensurable ideologies. A case in point is the wide range of
reasonable sentencing justifications, both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist. As recounted by Justice Breyer, the diversity of views
made it impossible for the U.S. Sentencing Commission to construct a
single theoretically grounded punishment scheme: “We couldn’t
because there are such good arguments all over the place pointing in
opposite directions.” 189 In general, then, how are we to get along and
act collectively for the betterment of society?
The object here is not just a political compromise, which tends to
provide only a temporary modus vivendi and can carry significant error
costs. In the worst-case scenario, a compromise on moral principles can
be counter-productive, especially if antagonists engage in “facesmashing” 190 operations along the way, leaving open wounds and scores
189 Jeffrey Rosen, Breyer Restraint, NEW REPUBLIC, July 11, 1994, at 19, 25 (quoting Breyer).
The resulting compromise by the Commission has been roundly criticized by some scholars,
including one of us. See Luna, Gridland, supra note 29, at 45-46.
190 See, e.g., Luna, Rorschach Test, supra note 98, at 61-74.
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to settle and setting the stage for further conflict. If any of the political
camps wants to gain the high ground, they may simply abandon the
agreement to improve their position. Moreover, political horse trading
is an infrequent vehicle of broad social agreements and unlikely to
provide principles for further progress on the issue in question. In the
present case, meaningful sentencing reform with a realistic prospect for
further improvements may require a political consensus grounded in
mutually agreed upon principles.
A.

Minimalism—Philosophical, Judicial, and Political

In his book, Political Liberalism, John Rawls developed the idea of
an “overlapping consensus” as an answer to the plurality of reasonable
but incompatible theories in a liberal society. 191 Obviously, advocates
of different moral and religious doctrines will not agree all the way
down, so to speak. But consistent with their respective worldviews,
they may nonetheless concur on certain constitutional principles that
together comprise a conception of justice. 192 People will agree on these
principles for their own reasons, affirming, rather than compromising,
their espoused comprehensive doctrines. This provides the best
motivation to support, defend, and act upon the principles within the
overlapping consensus, without disparaging or denying the theoretical
commitments of others. The overlapping consensus thus suggests that
highly particularized conflict among comprehensive doctrines can be
overcome through abstraction and principled agreement on a
constitutional structure, which can then provide the basis for political
action.
In contrast, minimalism in legal theory has focused on the specific
role of the courts within a constitutional democracy. The problem
posed by judicial review of the political branches is well known—the
“countermajoritarian difficulty,” as Alexander Bickel called it—with
politically unaccountable judges able to thwart the will of the majority
as expressed through elected officials. 193 This great power must be
tempered with prudence, Bickel argued in the early 1960s, in order to
sidestep unnecessary conflicts with the political branches. By using a
variety of jurisprudential techniques, the Supreme Court could avoid
deciding problematic cases, or at least the substantive issues they
191 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-72 (1993); see also John Rawls, Reply to
Habermas, 92 J. PHIL. 132 (1995).
192 For Rawls, this conception is “justice as fairness.” See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE (1971).
193 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962).
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presented. 194 As a result, the Justices neither legitimized a dubious
political act nor placed the Court at odds with the political branches and
the public, thereby providing time for reflection while gathering
information and resources for future review should the issue not be
resolved through democratic means.
Cass Sunstein offers a contemporary account of judicial
minimalism, based on his notion of “incompletely theorized
agreements.” 195 Like Rawls, Sunstein seeks an approach to deal with
conflict among reasonable views, in particular, theories of judicial
interpretation. Aficionados of originalism, textualism, political process
theory, precedent, natural law, moral reading, and so on, entertain deep
disagreements over interpretive methodology and even the Supreme
Court’s raison d’être. Nonetheless, judges with different worldviews
can still agree on an appropriate decision in the case before them
without assenting to a single theory that justifies that outcome.
The result is an incompletely theorized agreement, a small step that
is consistent with but does not invoke any jurist’s grand theory. The
decision is shallow in that it leaves foundational issues unanswered, and
it is narrow by resolving the precise issue before the Court while putting
off related issues for another day. This judicial minimalism facilitates
decisions where more ambitious judgments would be impossible.
Minimalist decisions can also reduce error costs in the face of limited
information, show respect for those who embrace rival theories, quiet
social controversy while promoting incremental change, and inspire
discussion and further reform through the democratic process.
We would like to suggest that philosophical and judicial
minimalism could have a cousin of sorts, what might be called “political
minimalism.” The relevant body is not the entire populace of a liberal
society à la Rawls, although the public is a critical audience for the
ensuing decisions. Federal judges will be the ones directly applying any
resolution to specific cases—but in contrast to the theories of Bickel and
Sunstein, courts are not the primary focus.
Instead, national
representatives are the crux of political minimalism. They are the ones
who will be the subject of an overlapping consensus on basic principles
and can bring about small but critical steps in the reform of mandatory
minimum sentencing. Unlike Rawls’s hypothetical interlocutors,
194 See id.; Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40
(1961). The techniques include discretionary denial of jurisdiction, doctrines such as vagueness
and political question, and case or controversy requirements. But see Gerald Gunther, The Subtle
Vices of the “Passive Virtues,” 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964) (providing a devastating critique of
Bickel’s thesis).
195 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733
(1995).
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federal officials have to get down to details if decisions are to be made.
It is not enough to just agree on a conception of justice. And unlike
Bickel and Sunstein’s minimalist judges, lawmakers have explicit
political platforms and constituents. They will have to run for office
again, and opponents may try to skewer them on their legislative record.
Political minimalism nonetheless draws upon the wisdom offered
by scholarly advocates of theoretical and judicial minimalism. As
Rawls notes, abstraction to constitutional principles “is a way of
continuing public discussion when shared understandings of lesser
generality have broken down.” 196 To connect particularized conflicts
and concerns with something recognizable and indispensable, we must
turn to “the fundamental ideas implicit in the public political culture.”197
Per Bickel, prudential moves can avoid unnecessary clashes by
sidestepping large substantive issues that might put a decision-maker at
odds with the citizenry. In the meantime, the relevant body can gather
data and resources for further action. Likewise, shallow and narrow
decisions in the Sunsteinian model facilitate small but otherwise
unattainable agreements, which allow each participant to maintain their
theoretical commitments, minimize the societal costs of error and the
professional costs of public backlash, and establish the groundwork for
further action.
As we see it, political minimalism may involve at least three steps:
(1) articulating mutually agreed upon principles that can inform and
justify a political decision; (2) locating the appropriate vehicles and
materials for the decision; and (3) operationalizing the decision into the
language of law. For the reform of mandatory minimums, the first two
steps will be discussed immediately below, and the third step will be the
topic of Part IV.
B.

Principles for Political Minimalism

In searching for principles to support minimalist decision-making
on mandatory sentencing, the objective is to find constitutional or sociopolitical concepts that receive widespread support among lawmakers
and their constituents. It is not necessary for politicians and the public
to agree on particular conceptions of these principles. For example,
virtually all Americans endorse the concept of free speech despite
disagreement on its application to commercial advertising, pornography,
campaign contributions, and so on. But as long as a decision is truly
minimalist—a small, consciously under-theorized step that skirts any

196
197

RAWLS, supra note 191, at 46.
Id.
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larger controversy—such differences need not hinder the process. Each
participant can remain true to their chosen ideology and credibly argue
that the decision is consistent with highly valued principles.
The minimalist approach hopes to provide justification for the
many officials who, we believe, could support at least some reform of
mandatory sentencing. Each lawmaker can point out that the new law
affirms the separation of powers doctrine, for instance, and the value of
proportionality in sentencing, given that reasonable conceptions of these
principles are in harmony with the reform we propose in the next Part.
Presumably, constituents would be inclined to adopt the position of their
respective representatives, whose interpretations of constitutional
principles are likely to be shared by those within his or her home district
(or even state). Whatever conception comes to mind is likely to be
positive (e.g., the virtuous images associated with the term “equality”)
and consistent with minimalist action.
As will be seen below, lawmakers concerned about campaign
consequences can note that the reform is not a legislative repeal of
mandatory minimums but instead a narrow exception applied in extreme
circumstances. Since the laws remain on the books, die-hard supporters
of mandatory sentencing can still rely on the purported advantages of
such schemes (e.g., deterring potential offenders and providing
prosecutorial leverage in serious cases). Nonetheless, criminal justice
actors will recognize that a minimalist law can still serve as a decision
rule in a particular case, presenting a psychological and, if necessary, a
practical check on abusive deployment of mandatory minimums. In
turn, those who oppose mandatory minimums in any form can view this
as the first step and a foundation for future reforms.
Most importantly, the basic principles might offer grounds for
consensus among all groups. Here are some possible principles that
could inform a minimalist proposal and animate discussion about
reforms to mandatory sentencing:
• Separation of Powers. One of the central concerns of liberal society is
the arbitrary, oppressive authority that stems from the accumulation of
too much power in too few hands. The traditional solution is to create a
system of checks and balances, distributing power across government
institutions in a manner that precludes any entity from exercising
excessive authority and sets each body as a restraint on the others. 198
Along these lines, the U.S. Constitution employs a pair of structural
devices, the first being the separation of powers among co-equal

198 See, e.g., BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS bk. XI, ch. 6 (Thomas
Nugent trans., 1914) (1748), available at http://www.constitution.org/cm/sol.txt; THE
FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).
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branches—the legislative, executive, and judicial 199 —each having
“mutual relations” in a series of checks and balances. 200
• Constitutional Roles. Within this framework, prosecutors and judges
occupy distinct but overlapping roles in the criminal justice system. The
prosecution has the discretionary authority to instigate charges against a
defendant, amass evidence of crime, and seek convictions as an adversary
in the trial process. The prosecutor has a personal stake in the
outcome, 201 however, and cannot be described as an ordinary party,
considering the vast power he wields and the principal he represents. 202
In contrast, the function of the judge is to serve as a neutral arbiter and
dispassionate decision-maker in individual cases.
Moreover, an
independent judiciary was meant to protect individuals from the
prejudices and heedlessness of lawmakers and executive officials. 203
• Federalism.
The division of power between national and state
governments provides the second structural device to prevent the
arbitrary, repressive tendencies of concentrated authority. Grounded in
the text and context of the Constitution, 204 federalism limits the powers
of national government and prevents federal interference with the core
internal affairs of the states. 205 One of the areas that the Framers sought
to reserve to the states was “the ordinary administration of criminal and
civil justice.” 206 Although there are various arguments in favor of
federalism, such as pluralistic decision-making and local
experimentation, 207 “the principal benefit of the federalist system” is the
199
200
201
202

U.S. CONST. arts. I-III.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 263 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
See supra notes 114-14 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); see also Robert H. Jackson, The
Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1940).
203 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 200, at 405-06; see
also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
204 Specifically, federalism was enshrined in the U.S. Constitution by expressly enumerating
the powers of the federal government, see U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, and by declaring that all other
powers were “reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” Id. amend. X; see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), supra note 200, at 292-93.
205 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), supra note 200, at 292-93.
206 THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 200, at 120. The Constitution
mentioned only a handful of crimes in its text, all of which were consistent with the design and
limits of federalism. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 6 (counterfeiting); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (piracy,
felonies on the high seas, offenses against the law of nations); id. art. III, § 3 (treason).
207 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1484 (1987). In a pluralistic society, citizens in different communities are likely to
have distinct views on the substance and process of criminal justice. State and local decisionmakers are more likely to be attuned to such preferences, given their closeness to constituents and
the greater opportunity for citizens to be involved in state and local government, including the
legal system. Unencumbered by national dictates, states may even become laboratories of
experimentation in criminal justice. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
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protection of individual liberties by preventing the concentration of
power and the ensuing danger of government overreaching. 208
• Proportionality. Among the restraints liberalism places on the criminal
process is a prohibition on excessive sentences. 209 As explicated in
current doctrine, this limit concerns not only barbaric penalties but also
punishment disproportionate to the underlying offense. 210 For many, the
idea of proportionality between crime and punishment expresses a
universal principle of justice and a restriction on government power that
has been recognized throughout history and across cultures. 211
Proportionality analysis naturally takes into consideration the gravity of
the offense and the severity of the punishment. The assessment might
also look within and without the relevant criminal justice system by
examining how the jurisdiction punishes arguably more serious crimes
and how other jurisdictions treat the same offense. 212
• Equality. The concept of equality—that all people are equal before the
law and that any legal distinction requires justification—is embedded in
liberal thought and considered fundamental to a just society. 213 Equality
in the Aristotelian sense requires decision-makers to treat like cases alike,

208 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“Just as the separation and
independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the
States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”);
see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).
209 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (banning “cruel and unusual punishments”); Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“No
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment.”);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, ¶¶ 7, 10, U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 19, 1966), reprinted in 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(similar); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (Dec. 10, 1984) (similar).
210 See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983).
211 See Luna Testimony, supra note 37, at 1 n.3.
212 All of these considerations are part of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment test to
determine whether a term of imprisonment amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. In Solem v.
Helm, the Court held “as a matter of principle that a criminal sentence must be proportionate to
the crime for which the defendant has been convicted.” Solem, 463 U.S. at 289. According to the
Solem Court, “proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by
objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the
sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and (iii) the sentences imposed for
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Id. at 292. This three-part test was later
adopted by Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in Harmelin v. Michigan, in which he concluded
that the Eighth Amendment forbids “extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the
crime.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The
Solem-Harmelin three-part analysis is now the governing Eighth Amendment standard for terms
of imprisonment. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23-24 (2003) (noting that “Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence [in Harmelin] guide[s] our application of the Eighth Amendment”). As
mentioned above, however, the test has been essentially toothless in the courts.
213
See Erik Luna, Cuban Criminal Justice and the Ideal of Good Governance, 14
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 529, 590 n.246 (2004).
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and just as importantly, to treat dissimilar cases differently. 214 It would
thus be a violation of equality for relevantly similar offenders to receive
disparate sentences and for relevantly dissimilar offenders to receive
analogous sentences.
• Truth & Transparency. All decent criminal processes are concerned
about honesty and openness. The pursuit of truth presents a primary,
commonly understood goal of the American trial process. 215 Indeed,
truth-seeking appears to be a cross-cultural criterion of legitimacy in
criminal justice, to the point that justice is considered largely
unachievable without truth. 216 Likewise, transparency is not only a wellestablished norm of American public law, but also a background
assumption of representative democracy. Open government is widely
regarded as a necessary condition to effectively monitor and assess
official actions, and it provides an important basis for trust between
citizen and state. 217

Although the full meaning and appropriate application of these
principles can be debated ad nauseam, a consensus may still be reached
regarding the core values of each principle. Consider, for instance, the
separation of powers and the role of the judiciary. As a matter of
history and experience, an autonomous court system under the guidance
of impartial jurists has proven to be an indispensable aspect of
American constitutional democracy. 218 The trial judge stands as the
only experienced decision-maker in a federal courtroom without a
personal interest in the outcome of a case. For this reason, the trial
court’s central functions have traditionally included dispositive criminal
justice issues that demand evenhanded judgment, among them, the
appropriate sentence in particular cases.
Coming from judges themselves, this position on court
prerogatives would not be altogether unexpected. But similar (if not
stronger) attitudes have been expressed by some conservative
commentators, who oppose mandatory minimums based on an
originalist interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine and the
role of the courts in sentencing. 219 What is more, the vast majority of
214
215
216

Cf. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 97 (Carnes Lord trans., 1984).
See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 1 CRIM. PROC. § 1.5(b) (3d ed. 2009).
See, e.g., Thomas Weigend, Is the Criminal Process About Truth?: A German Perspective,
26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 157, 172 (2003).
217 See, e.g., Luna, Transparent Policing, supra note 29.
218 See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 172-82 (1952); Robert M. Howard &
Henry F. Carey, Is an Independent Judiciary Necessary for Democracy?, 87 JUDICATURE 284
(2004).
219 See, e.g., Keene Testimony, supra note 7, at 117-18:
[M]y opposition to mandatory minimums . . . is rooted in conservative principles;
namely, reverence for the Constitution and contempt for government action that
ignores the differences among individuals. . . . James Madison, for one, believed that a
clear separation of powers was more vital to protecting freedom than the Bill of Rights.
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Americans, both Democrat and Republican, believe that courts are
generally the proper bodies to be making sentencing judgments in
individual cases. 220
Reflection upon the other principles would yield comparable
conclusions. Although the federal government was not provided a
general police power in the Constitution, 221 Congress has assumed such
authority in criminal matters, occasionally with a nod to an enumerated
power, usually the regulation of interstate commerce. Whether or not
this arrogation of authority is constitutional, it is surely here to stay.
This does not mean, however, that politicians, courts, and commentators
have been or should be oblivious to considerations of federalism. At
times, both liberals and conservatives have expressed such concerns
about government policies. 222 Although political partisans may not
invoke federalism in the same cases, they appear to agree on its core
value.
Admittedly, the principles of proportionality and equality raise
difficult issues in sentencing. In measuring the gravity of an offense for
proportionality analysis, one might look to, among other things, “the
harm caused or threatened to the victim or society.” 223 Although harm
is a notoriously thorny idea, 224 most agree that the basic criminal harms
involve acts or threats of physical violence and non-consensual or
fraudulent deprivations of others’ property. 225 Another difficult issue

Yet mandatory minimums undermine this important protector of liberty by allowing
the legislature to steal jurisdiction over sentencing, which has historically been a
judicial function. The attempt by legislatures and the Congress to address perceived
problems in the justice system by transferring power from judges to prosecutors and
the executive branch violate these principles and have, in the process, given
prosecutors unreviewable authority to influence sentences through their charging
decisions and plea bargaining power.
Id.
220
221

See Omnibus Survey, supra note 8.
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S.
419, 443 (1827).
222 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic
Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265,
265 (1990); Kadish, Overfederalization, supra note 93, at 1247; see also infra note 309 and
accompanying text (citing and quoting court cases).
223 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288-93 (1983); see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,
275 (1980).
224 Consider, for instance, the scholarly debate regarding Mill’s theory of the liberal state and
his famous “harm principle.” See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 13
(Stefan Collini ed., 1989) (1859) (“[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others.”). The theory elides the difficulties in distinguishing between “self-regarding” and “other
regarding” harm; moreover, Mill acknowledged that “offences against decency” could provide a
basis for criminalization. See id. at 98. See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the
Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1999).
225 See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE: IMPLICATIONS
FOR CRIMINAL LAW AND JUSTICE POLICY 1 (2007).
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concerns the facts or circumstances that should be relevant to equality in
punishment. As evinced by many modern sentencing schemes,
however, there appears to be some concurrence on pertinent factors,
such as the gravity of the offense, the defendant’s criminal history, and
his prospects for reform or recidivism. 226 At this level of abstraction,
proportionality and equality could receive broad political consensus.
There are obvious limits to the principles of truth and transparency.
Although truth is a core value in the criminal justice system, it is
sometimes trumped by other concerns, such as privacy, autonomy, and
human dignity. Under current jurisprudence, courts may exclude from
trial reliable evidence probative of the truth, 227 and weighty
considerations may also limit the level of openness of law
enforcement. 228 Nonetheless, reasonable exceptions do not undermine
the general rule that government action should be transparent and the
criminal process should pursue the truth. When the issue is punishment,
a legitimate system would not allow fictions to be presented as facts
through an obscure process.
All of these principles might be evident in the new crack cocaine
law, although considerations of equality (and proportionality) tended to
dominate the debate. Of particular relevance were the issue of racial
disproportionality in drug sentencing and the concomitant distrust of
law enforcement. For instance, five prominent conservatives argued
that the law “will increase confidence in the criminal justice system by
reducing the perception of racial bias.” 229
According to analyses by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, the
disparity between crack and powder cocaine sentences has had a
disproportionately negative impact on African Americans. Blacks
use crack at about the same rate as whites but nearly 80 percent of
federal crack defendants in 2009 were African American, and crack
sentences were, on average, over two years longer than sentences for
powder cocaine offenses. Law enforcement and criminal justice

226 Compare, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (listing purposes of criminal sentences), with
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.005 (2006) (same).
227 Evidence may be suppressed if, for instance, government agents violated a defendant’s
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, his privilege against self-incrimination, or
his right to an attorney. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). It should be noted that
one of us (Cassell) has been a leading opponent of the exclusionary rule. See supra note 28
(listing work in opposition to Miranda); see also Paul G. Cassell, The Mysterious Creation of
Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules Under State Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993
UTAH L. REV. 751 (1993).
228 For example, law enforcement may not disclose information about ongoing criminal
investigations in order to prevent the destruction of evidence and witness intimidation, as well as
to ensure that suspects do not flee the jurisdiction. See, e.g., Luna, Transparent Policing, supra
note 29, at 1165.
229 Letter from Pat Nolan et al., to Hon. John A. Boehner, House Minority Leader (May 25,
2010), available at http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/BOEHNER%20LETTER.pdf.
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experts say that these discriminatory effects undermine trust in the
criminal justice system, especially in minority communities. 230

In the end, the reform was minimalist in scope, reducing the
crack/powder differential and eliminating the 5-year mandatory
minimum for simple possession. A few lawmakers called for broader
reforms, 231 while others said they would not have supported a major
transformation. 232 However, most officials described the new law as a
step in the right direction and a potential foundation for further
change. 233
C.

Vehicles and Materials for Political Minimalism

Accepting the need for legislative modification, informed by the
aforementioned principles (or others like them), we can now turn to the
vehicle for a minimalist approach. Again, the goal of political
minimalism is to take a small step that limits the impediments to reform,
offering a change that lawmakers may espouse on principle and
providing a potential starting point for further reforms. In contrast to
maximalist strategies, such as directly repealing mandatory minimum
punishments en masse, the minimalist approach to reform might create
exceptions to obligatory sentences when reasons exist to believe that
such punishment would be unjust in a particular case. One means is to
fashion a “safety valve” that permits a judge to sentence a defendant
below a mandatory minimum when certain criteria are met. A few
states have such provisions to prevent injustices under their mandatory
sentencing laws 234 —and, in fact, the federal system contains a safety
valve as well.
The current federal provision allows judges to go below an
otherwise applicable mandatory minimum sentence in low-level drug
cases involving essentially non-violent, first-time offenders who have

230
231

Id.
For instance, Congressman Ron Paul referred to the law as “the Slightly Fairer Sentencing
Act” and advocated the repeal of all federal drug crimes. 156 CONG. REC. H6202-03 (daily ed.
July 28, 2010) (statement of Rep. Ron Paul), 156 Cong Rec H6196-01, at *H6202-03 (Westlaw);
see also id. at H6198-202 (bill proposed by Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee).
232 See, e.g., id. at H6202 (statement of Rep. Dan Lungren).
233 See, e.g., id. at H6197 (statement of Rep. Bobby Scott).
234 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-37(b) (West 2010) (stating that any person guilty
of carrying a gun without a permit “shall be imprisoned not less than one year or more than five
years” but allowing a reduction of the one-year mandatory minimum if there are “mitigating
circumstances as determined by the court”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252(5-A)(B)
(2010) (creating an exception to mandatory minimum sentences for certain drug crimes if the
court finds, inter alia, that imposing the mandatory minimum “will result in substantial injustice
to the defendant”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-222 (2010) (listing exceptions to mandatory
minimum sentences); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.712 (2010) (same).
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disclosed all relevant information to the government. 235 The provision
is commonly seen as a successful means of preventing unjust
punishments without hampering the general objectives of sentencing.
But the current federal safety valve is rather limited and applicable only
to certain drug crimes. 236 In fact, some prosecutors may charge noncovered drug offenses in order to preclude the court from applying the
safety valve to potentially eligible defendants. 237 Moreover, the safety
valve requires that each criterion be met, drastically narrowing the pool
of defendants who qualify for relief. An offender might be ineligible
because he possessed (but did not brandish) a firearm, his criminal
history precludes his classification as a first-time offender, or he is
charged under mandatory sentencing laws unrelated to drug crime.
A minimalist reform could expand the application of the safety
valve so that it is more generally available to defendants who might
otherwise receive an excessive prison sentence. 238 The tricky point, of
course, is identifying those cases in which a mandatory minimum
sentence would be unjust. Most agree that at least some offenders who
receive mandatory minimums have committed sufficiently serious
crimes to merit those sentences. An overly broad safety valve provision
would be politically vulnerable to the charge that it effectively repealed
all mandatory minimum sentences, creating a loophole for the worst-ofthe-worst offenders. 239 As it turns out, however, federal law already has

235
236

18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2006); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2 (2010).
Specifically, it only applies to defendants convicted under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844, 846, 960
and 963. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).
237 See, e.g., Nicholas T. Drees, Fed. Pub. Defender, N. & S. Dists. of Iowa, Testimony at
Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission, at 8-9 (Oct. 21, 2009) (transcript
available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20091020/Drees_Testimony.pdf).
[The safety valve] does not include 21 U.S.C. § 860, which prohibits drug activities
within 1000 feet of schools, playgrounds, and other protected locations. Thus,
defendants convicted under this statute cannot obtain safety valve relief. In districts
where substantial portions of small towns and cities fall within protected zones,
prosecutors can, and some do, charge violations of 21 U.S.C. § 860 for the purpose of
preventing safety valve relief for low-level offenders with little or no criminal history
who would otherwise qualify. In the Northern District of Iowa, prosecutors often
include a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860 among the other charges in an indictment. The
Southern District does not follow this practice. Based on my survey of Defenders,
similar manipulations occur in four other districts.
Id.
238 See, e.g., Cory L. Andrews, Wash. Legal Found., Testimony at Public Hearing Before the
U.S. Sentencing Commission, at 5 (May 27, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.ussc.gov/
AGENDAS/20100527/Testimony_Corey_Andrews_WLF.pdf) (advancing such a proposal).
239 Two congressional bills would allow a court to “impose a sentence below a statutory
minimum if the court finds that it is necessary to do so in order to avoid violating” the purposes
of punishment. See The Common Sense in Sentencing Act, H.R. 2934, 111th Cong. (2009); The
Ramos-Compean Justice Act of 2009, H.R. 3327, 111th Cong. (2009). Although Luna generally
supports these bills, given his aversion to many mandatory minimum sentencing laws, he
recognizes that the proposals are likely infeasible as a political matter.
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a possible method to identify situations where mandatory minimum
sentences may be excessive.
In 1984, Congress created the U.S. Sentencing Commission as an
expert agency that would promulgate a set of sentencing guidelines for
every federal offense. These guidelines, which came into effect in
1987, were designed to consider all relevant issues and provide a
recommended sentence. When a defendant’s punishment under the
guidelines is lower than that required by a statutory minimum, there
may be good reason to believe that the application of the mandatory
sentence would be excessive. For many, this belief would be justified
by the composition of the Commission and the general convergence
between public opinion and guidelines sentences. 240
Legal scholars and jurists have debated the merits of the
Sentencing Commission and its guidelines for nearly two decades.
Some have questioned the alleged expertise of the Commission, the
mechanical and sometimes incomprehensible nature of guidelines
calculations, and the machinations by practitioners to avoid otherwise
inevitable sentences—not to mention doubts about whether the
guidelines provide uniformity in any meaningful sense or serve the
consequentialist and non-consequentialist goals of punishment. 241
Moreover, critics raised doubts about the constitutionality of the entire
endeavor. In a memorable dissent in the 1989 case, Mistretta v. United
States, Justice Antonin Scalia could find no place for an agency like the
Commission that acts as “a sort of junior varsity Congress,” describing
as disastrous “in the long run the improvisation of a constitutional
structure on the basis of currently perceived utility.” 242
Nonetheless, the Mistretta Court upheld the Sentencing
Commission and the guidelines scheme against several structural
constitutional challenges. According to the eight-member majority, the
legislation did not produce an excessive delegation of legislative power
because Congress created intelligible principles for the Commission’s
rule-making. Likewise, the Court found that the scheme did not violate
the separation of powers doctrine, relying on the fact that the
congressional delegation to the judiciary involved policy creation “on a
240 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (D. Utah 2005) (Cassell, J.)
(Wilson II); United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005) (Cassell, J.) (Wilson I);
Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe?: A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and a Critique of
the Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017 (2004); PETER ROSSI & RICHARD
BERK, JUST PUNISHMENTS: FEDERAL GUIDELINES AND PUBLIC VIEWS COMPARED (1997).
241 See, e.g., United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365 (D. Mass. 2005) (Gertner, J.); United
States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (Adelman, J.); Luna, Gridland, supra
note 29; STITH & CABRANES, supra note 70; Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing
Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901 (1991); James S. Gwin, Juror
Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Reflect Community
Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173 (2010).
242 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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matter uniquely within the ken of judges.” 243 Although one of us
(Luna) has expressed a strong preference for razing the entire system, he
recognizes that the Commission and its guidelines are here to stay, at
least for the foreseeable future. 244
Some concerns about the guidelines stemmed from their
construction as a judicial straightjacket, with punishment effectively
limited to the prescribed sentencing range absent a defendant’s
cooperation with law enforcement. 245 As such, this critique mirrors a
key criticism of mandatory minimums: The guidelines regime
eliminated a judge’s discretion to craft a punishment that fits the offense
and the offender, and it even encouraged the parties to massage the facts
to avoid an otherwise preordained sentence. 246 In 2005, however, a
groundbreaking Supreme Court decision tempered at least part of the
dispute over the guidelines.
In United States v. Booker, 247 the Court held that it violated the
Sixth Amendment jury trial right to increase a guidelines sentence based
on facts that were neither admitted by the defendant nor found true
beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. For present purposes, however,
the most relevant portion of the Court’s opinion was the remedy it
endorsed. By excising a pair of statutory provisions, Booker rendered
the guidelines advisory rather than mandatory for sentencing judges,
subject to appellate review for “reasonableness.” 248 For guidelines
skeptics, the Court’s decision opened up new possibilities for federal
punishment 249 —and if nothing else, it held out the hope that a district
court could ensure that a sentence fits the offense and the offender
consistent with the valid goals of punishment. With overt sentencing
discretion restored, some cheered that “federal judges can be federal
judges again.” 250
The Booker decision did not license ad hoc sentencing, however.
The Commission’s work product was still the only complete set of
criteria available to district court judges. Moreover, some warned that
haphazard application of the guidelines might not only produce
unwarranted disparities among defendants, but it could also provoke a
punitive response by Congress “through such blunderbuss devices as
mandatory minimum sentences.” 251 With these caveats in mind, most

243
244
245
246
247
248
249

Id. at 412 (majority opinion).
See, e.g., Luna, Gridland, supra note 29, at 89; STITH & CABRANES, supra note 70, at xi.
See, e.g., supra note 72.
See, e.g., Luna, Gridland, supra note 29.
543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (merits majority).
Id. at 259 (remedial majority).
See, e.g., Erik Luna & Barton Poulson, Restorative Justice in Federal Sentencing: An
Unexpected Benefit of Booker?, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 787 (2006).
250 Id. at 287 (quoting sources).
251 Wilson I, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 1288.
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jurists and commentators have eschewed a post-Booker “free at last”
approach that would simply ignore the guidelines. 252 Instead, they
accept the guidelines as a given (at least for now) and have sought a
jurisprudence that makes the system more rational and fair. 253
In practice, the federal judiciary continues to give considerable
weight to the guidelines, 254 which, as a statistical matter, remain the
dominant feature of federal sentencing. 255 A recent survey of U.S.
district courts found that a substantial majority of the judges support the
current system and believe that the guidelines ranges were appropriate
for most federal crimes. 256 Conversely, two-thirds of the judges think
that mandatory minimum sentences are too high. 257 To be sure, some
critics still have reservations about the guidelines even in their nowadvisory role, 258 but those concerns may pale in comparison to the very
real injustices that can occur with mandatory minimums. In other
words, almost everyone (including guidelines skeptics) would agree that
using the guidelines to ameliorate the worst instances of excessive
mandatory sentencing would be an improvement over the current status
quo.
A few illustrations may help clarify how the guidelines system
could be used to identify miscarriages of justice under mandatory
minimums. Consider the case of United States v. Weldon Angelos, 259
where a young, first-time offender was convicted of dealing marijuana
and related offenses. The critical events in the case were three
“controlled buys” by a government informant, each involving
approximately $350 worth of marijuana. 260 Both the prosecution and

252
253

See, e.g., United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 370 (D. Mass. 2005).
See, e.g., Constitution Project Sentencing Initiative, Recommendations for Federal
Criminal Sentencing in a Post-Booker World, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 310, 312-13 (2006)
[hereinafter Post-Booker World], available at 2006 WL 5001562; see also CONSTITUTION
PROJECT SENTENCING INITIATIVE, PRINCIPLES FOR THE DESIGN AND REFORM OF SENTENCING
SYSTEMS: A BACKGROUND REPORT (2006), http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage/
file/34.pdf; Brief for Douglas A. Berman et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting None of the Parties,
Claiborne v. United States, 551 U.S. 87 (2006) (No. 06-5618), 2006 WL 3747721; Brief for
Douglas A. Berman et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting None of the Parties, Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338 (2006) (No. 06-5754), 2006 WL 3747721.
254 See, e.g., Wilson I, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 910; Wilson II, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 1269; Jaber, 362
F. Supp. 2d at 365; United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 984 (E.D. Wis. 2005); Luna,
Gridland, supra note 29, at 58-60, 60 n.208.
255 See 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at tbl.N, available at http://www.ussc.gov/
ANNRPT/2008/TableN.pdf (showing 85% of sentences either within guidelines range or below
guidelines range only because of government motion).
256 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGES, JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 11 tbl.8 (2010), http://www.ussc.gov/Judge_
Survey/2010/JudgeSurvey_201006.pdf.
257 Id. at 5 tbl.1.
258 See, e.g., Luna, Gridland, supra note 29, at 62-64, 72-106.
259 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2004); see also supra notes 5-6.
260 See United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231 (D. Utah 2004).
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the defense agreed that the appropriate guidelines range for the
defendant’s sentence was 78-97 months. 261 But because he was also
convicted of possessing a gun three times in connection with his
marijuana dealing, he faced additional mandatory minimum penalties
under federal law: 5 years for the first possession, followed by 25 years
for the second possession, topped off by another 25 years for the third
possession, all to be served consecutively. 262 Although decrying the
punishment as “cruel, unjust, and irrational,” the trial court reluctantly
sentenced the defendant to a mandatory 55-year prison term for the
firearm possession counts (plus one day for all the other counts), which
was subsequently affirmed by the Tenth Circuit. 263
Another instructive case is United States v. Marion Hungerford. 264
The defendant, a fifty-two-year old mentally disturbed woman with no
prior criminal record, was convicted of conspiracy, robbery, and using a
firearm in relation to these crimes. She never touched a firearm or
threatened anyone, and her role in the criminal episode was limited,
particularly compared to that of her companion, the gun-wielding
principal who committed the robberies. While her boyfriend pled out
and received a 32-year sentence, the defendant “tragically refused to
cooperate with the government and plead guilty, most likely because her
mental illness caused her to hold a fixed belief that she was
innocent.” 265 The defendant’s range of incarceration was 57-71 months
under the sentencing guidelines. But because of the applicable
mandatory minimums, she received a prison sentence of 159 years,
which was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. Although he felt bound to
concur in the judgment, one appellate judge underscored “how
irrational, inhumane, and absurd the sentence in this case is, and
moreover, how this particular sentence is a predictable by-product of the
cruel and unjust mandatory minimum sentencing scheme adopted by
Congress.” 266
The only question, he concluded, was whether
lawmakers would ameliorate this scheme and bring rationality back to
the federal system. 267
Now consider United States v. James Lewis Moore, 268 a case
recently decided by the Third Circuit. A sex crime investigation
conducted by Australian officials led the FBI to the defendant’s house,
where he admitted to possessing child pornography. A subsequent
consent search of his computer revealed 321 pornographic images,
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268

Id. at 1232; see also infra note 283.
See Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1232.
Id. at 1230; see also United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2005).
United States v. Hungerford, 465 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1121 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1118.
Id. at 1122.
No. 09-3060, 2010 WL 1293369 (3d Cir. Apr. 6, 2010).
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“virtually all of minors under the age of twelve engaging in sexually
explicit conduct” and including “portrayals of sadistic conduct whereby
babies were physically restrained.” 269 The defendant was convicted of
receiving and distributing child pornography, which carried a 5-year
mandatory minimum sentence. Under the guidelines, however, the
applicable sentencing range was 135-168 months’ imprisonment. 270
The district court eventually issued a 10-year sentence—15 months
below the bottom of the guidelines range—balancing the serious nature
of the crime versus the defendant’s personal history and
characteristics. 271 The sentence was affirmed on appeal as substantively
reasonable. 272
A final example is provided by United States v. Emory James
Zastrow. 273 In that case, law enforcement received reports that the
defendant had had sexual contact with a prepubescent girl. The
exploitation had begun before the victim’s eighth birthday and was
evidenced by sexually explicit photographs taken by the defendant. 274
He was charged in federal court with sexual exploitation of a child by
persuading, enticing, or coercing a minor victim to engage in sexually
explicit conduct for the purpose of producing visual depictions. The
crime carried a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence, but the
applicable guidelines range exceeded the minimum by several years
(210-262 months). Ultimately, the trial court adopted the guidelines
range, sentencing the defendant to 20-years imprisonment, and the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentence as reasonable. 275
This is not the place to decide whether the 10-year sentence in
Moore or the 20-year sentence in Zastrow were necessarily correct.
Reasonable minds can differ on such issues, given general disagreement
about the wisdom of the federal sentencing scheme and concerns
regarding the severity of some guidelines. 276 But as a matter of
prioritizing any reform, it makes some sense for efforts to be directed
away from those cases where the guidelines are higher than the
mandatory minimums and toward the more clearly extreme cases where
the guidelines are lower. In the latter situation, defenders of the
sentencing guidelines would have to agree that the mandatory minimum
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276

Id. at *1.
See id. at *1 n.1.
See id. at *2 n.3.
See id. at *2-3.
See United States v. Zastrow, 534 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2008).
See id. at 856.
See id. at 856-57.
Compare A.G. Sulzberger, Defiant Judge Takes on Child Pornography Law, N.Y. TIMES,
May 21, 2010, at A1, with Ernie Allen, President, Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children,
Testimony at Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission (Oct. 20, 2009), available
at http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/NewsEventServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US
&PageId=4144.
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sentence could well be too high. After all, the guidelines that they
believe specify the appropriate punishment nonetheless point toward a
sentence below the mandatory minimum. Accordingly, situations
where the guidelines call for a lower sentence than the statutory
minimum—such as in the Angelos and Hungerford cases—might serve
as a convenient means to flag cases where the mandatory sentence may
be unjustified.
IV. OPERATIONALIZING MINIMALIST REFORM
Assuming that a minimalist approach would only implicate those
cases where mandatory minimums are clearly excessive—as
demonstrated by a lower guidelines range—the question becomes how
to translate the change into a principled law capable of achieving
political consensus. This section details two statutory modifications to
operationalize the envisioned reform. First, federal judges should have
the authority to depart downward whenever the guidelines provide for
the possibility of a lower sentence than a mandatory minimum. Second,
the U.S. Sentencing Commission should be licensed to set guidelines
ranges where it deems them to be appropriate, without automatically
pegging the guidelines to existing mandatory minimums. We discuss
these two modifications in turn and suggest how they comport with the
aforementioned principles.
A.

Departures when Guidelines Sentences Are
Lower than Mandatory Minimums

The first change would allow judges to go below a mandatory
minimum if the relevant sentencing guidelines are lower. One way to
draft such a statute would begin by cross-referencing a general safety
value provision:
18 U.S.C. § 3553. Imposition of a sentence
(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.—The
court shall impose a sentence in accordance with any
applicable mandatory minimum sentence, subject to
subsections (e) and (f). The sentence shall be sufficient, but
not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set
forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. . . .
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This modification (i.e., the underlined text) would preserve
mandatory minimums as the default rule for the trial judge, who must
impose a sentence consistent with federal statutes unless a case falls
within the purview of the safety valve provision. The new safety valve
would then replace its limited predecessor as follows:
18 U.S.C. § 3553. Imposition of a sentence
(f)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court
may impose a sentence below an otherwise applicable
mandatory minimum sentence (including a consecutive
mandatory minimum sentence) if the minimum of the
applicable sentencing guidelines for the defendant’s conduct
provides for a total sentence lower than what would otherwise
result from application of the mandatory minimum sentence,
provided that:
(A) the defendant’s offense or offenses did not result in death
or serious bodily injury to any person; and
(B) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the
defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all
information and evidence the defendant has concerning the
offense or offenses that were part of the same course of
conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the
defendant has no relevant or useful other information to
provide or that the Government is already aware of the
information shall not preclude a determination by the court that
the defendant has complied with this requirement.
(2) In determining whether to impose a sentence pursuant to
this subsection, the court may consider:
(A) the Government’s representations about whether the
defendant has truthfully provided all information as required by
subsection (f)(1)(B);
(B) the defendant’s criminal history as determined under the
sentencing guidelines;
(C) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of
violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or
induce another participant to do so) in connection with the
offense or offenses;
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(D) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or
supervisor of others in the offense or offenses, as determined
under the sentencing guidelines, and he was not engaged in a
continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. §
848(c);
(E) the sentences imposed on other offenders under the
sentencing guidelines;
(F) the sentences imposed for commission of the defendant’s
offense or offenses in other jurisdictions; and
(G) any other information relevant to the factors listed in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).
(3) The sentence that the court imposes shall not be lower than
the minimum provided in the applicable sentencing guidelines.
(4) In the written order of judgment and commitment, the court
must state with specificity the reasons for imposing a sentence
pursuant to this subsection. On appeal, the sentence and its
reasons shall be subject to review for reasonableness. 277
This formulation tracks some of the language in the current safety
valve provision but also makes key changes. It retains the condition
that no one was killed or suffered serious bodily injury as a result of the
defendant’s actions—a seemingly reasonable limitation, considering the
importance of harm for sentencing assessments and related concerns
about proportionality and equality, as well the reality that the
punishment provided by mandatory minimums will rarely be
inappropriate in such circumstances. 278 Under the new formulation,
however, the safety valve goes beyond first-time, low-level drug
offenders. Previous prerequisites, like the absence of a firearm, are now
factors that courts should consider, but they do not automatically
disqualify application of the safety valve.
The new provision still requires that a defendant truthfully provide
law enforcement with all information and evidence related to his
criminal conduct, listing the government’s representations regarding
such cooperation as a factor in whether the court should employ the
safety valve. It thus supports the prosecutorial interest in obtaining
information for law enforcement purposes. Nonetheless, the provision
277
278

Hereinafter “Proposed Safety Valve, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).”
Moreover, a sentence reduction via a prosecutor’s motion remains a possibility for full, upfront cooperation with law enforcement. See supra note 72.
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applies even if the defendant has gone to trial, or if he lacks relevant or
new information for governmental use, thereby permitting the court, in
appropriate cases, to enter a sentence over a prosecutor’s objections.
In order to help indicate appropriate cases, our proposal
incorporates some relatively objective components of the Supreme
Court’s standard for constitutionally excessive terms of
imprisonment. 279 Specifically, the safety valve includes both intrajurisdictional and inter-jurisdictional comparisons: (1) the punishment
imposed on other federal offenders, where lower sentences for more
serious crimes and criminals would suggest an excessive sentence in the
defendant’s case; and (2) the punishment that other jurisdictions (i.e.,
the states) would impose for the offense in question, with lower
sentences again indicating excessive punishment for the defendant.
We recognize, however, that it is difficult if not impossible to
capture in a formula all of the information that could be relevant in
deciding whether to invoke the safety valve. The myriad cases that
judges face cannot be reduced to a simple equation. 280 As such, the best
approach may be to exclude inappropriate factors and crimes (e.g., the
defendant’s race 281 or offenses that cause death), specifically permit
consideration of those factors that seem highly relevant (e.g., the
defendant’s criminal history or the presence of a firearm), and provide
some leeway for evaluating other issues pertinent to the goals of
sentencing.
The latter is accomplished by allowing judges to
incorporate any other information relevant to the purposes of
punishment listed in federal sentencing’s governing law.
This type of discretion—ensuring that the punishment fits the
crime and the criminal and, in the present context, gathering
information as to whether to impose a sentence below an otherwise
compulsory term of imprisonment—is essential to meaningful
proportionality and equality in sentencing. Indeed, this authority lies at
the heart of what it means to be a judge. The proposal thus attempts to
harmonize mandatory minimums with “the federal judicial tradition for
the sentencing judge to consider every convicted person as an individual
and every case as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes

279 See supra note 212. As a matter of constitutional law, Cassell is not sure he agrees that
sentence length should be subject to constitutional attack. Nonetheless, he accepts that the
standard first articulated in Solem is appropriate for the new safety valve provision.
280 Cf. Luna, Gridland, supra note 29, at 74-87; Luna, Punishment Theory, supra note 39, at
258-87.
281 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2006) (requiring federal sentencing to be “entirely neutral as to the
race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders”).
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mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to
ensue.” 282
However, our proposal precludes unfettered discretion by
substituting the lower guidelines range as a new sentencing floor. In the
Angelos case, for example, instead of a mandatory minimum sentence
of 55 years, the required sentence would have been at least 97
months. 283 This part of our proposal will be less than ideal for
opponents of mandatory minimums, as it means that judges will
continue to be bound to impose a base sentence in all cases where
mandatory minimums currently apply. 284 However, the approach rests
on the fact that, as a practical reality, any changes to mandatory
minimums may have to be made incrementally pursuant to the idea of
political minimalism.
Moreover, just as mandatory minimums create certain extreme
“cliff” effects in sentencing, completely ending mandatory minimum
sentences where there is a lower guidelines range could potentially do
the same thing in reverse. Consider two defendants who both face a
120-month mandatory minimum sentence. If the first defendant’s lower
guidelines range is, say, 121 months while the second defendant’s lower
range is 110 months, the latter could conceivably receive probation (i.e.,
0 month sentence) in the absence of a mandatory provision. This could
make the reform vulnerable to political attack as being too easy on
offenders and creating unwarranted sentencing disparities.
The case for making the low end of the guidelines range mandatory
may have been bolstered by a new empirical study of sentencing
282 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996). One district court even described
individualized sentencing as “required by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”
United States v. Dyck, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1020 (D.N.D. 2003).
The concept of individualized sentencing is deeply rooted in our legal tradition and is a
fundamental liberty interest. This due process right arises at sentencing because
sentencing involves the most extreme deprivation of personal liberty and therefore
calls for a highly individualized process where a person must be assessed and
sentenced as an individual.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
283 See United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1241 (D. Utah 2004).
Setting aside the three firearms offenses covered by the § 924(c) counts, all of Mr.
Angelos’s other criminal conduct results in an offense level of 28. Because Mr.
Angelos is a first-time offender, the Guidelines then specify a sentence of between 78
to 97 months. It is possible to determine, however, what a Guidelines sentence would
be covering all of Mr. Angelos’s conduct, including that covered by the § 924(c)
counts. If this conduct were punished under the Guidelines rather than under § 924(c),
the result would be an additional two-level enhancement, increasing the offense level
from a level 28 to a level 30. This, in turn, produces a recommended Guidelines
sentence for Mr. Angelos of 97 to 121 months.
Id.
284 Luna has some reservations about this limitation, based on his general opposition to
mandatory minimums and his prior concerns regarding the Commission’s methodology in
establishing guidelines ranges. Nonetheless, he accepts that a hard floor for the safety valve may
be politically necessary, and, if nothing else, it is consistent with a minimalist approach.
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disparity before and after Booker. 285 The results suggested a postBooker increase in inter-judge disparity in terms of sentence length and
guidelines sentencing patterns.
Interestingly, average sentences
increased over time—contrary to concerns raised by the previous Justice
Department—but individual judges tended to cluster around distinct
sentencing ranges, with the data revealing an average inter-judge
disparity of more than two years in prison. Likewise, the U.S.
Sentencing Commission recently released a follow-up report that found
a correlation between guidelines sentences and various demographic
differences, including race. 286
Both studies can be challenged, of course, along with any
conclusions that might have been drawn from them. In fact, within days
of the release of the Commission’s report, another study reached the
exact opposite conclusion: The Booker decision was reducing whatever
racial differences may be found in the federal system. 287 Moreover,
other studies have linked mandatory minimums to racial disparities,
thereby undercutting any suggestion that obligatory sentencing resolves
such discrimination. 288 Nonetheless, the new guidelines studies may
raise concerns of unjustifiable disparity in the federal system and
prompt further calls for mandatory minimums. 289 Needless to say, the
new safety valve should not exacerbate the situation.
A second limitation on discretion requires the sentencing judge to
provide in writing specific reasons for employing the safety valve in a
given case, thereby demanding that the trial court justify its use of the
provision and provide a written record that can be examined by an
appellate court. Consistent with the standard of review pronounced in
Booker, appellate judges would ensure the “reasonableness” of these
sentences, which, over time, could help create a jurisprudence that
guides trial courts in their use of the safety valve. The requirement of
reasoned explanation has been advocated by, among others, a
bipartisan, blue-ribbon committee report on federal sentencing in a postBooker world:
Such careful statements of reasons are essential to meaningful
appellate review of sentencing decisions. They are extraordinarily
useful to other sentencing judges faced with analogous cases. They
form an important component of the feedback to sentencing
285 See Scott, The Effects of Booker, supra note 70; Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing
Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2010).
286 See DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES, supra note 70.
287 See Ulmer et al., supra note 70.
288 See, e.g., Mauer Testimony, supra note 37, at 8-10; supra note 70.
289 For instance, one proposed response to Booker was across-the-board enactment of
mandatory sentencing laws as a means to prevent disparity and leniency. See, e.g., Defending
America’s Most Vulnerable: Safe Access to Drug Treatment and Child Protection Act of 2005,
H.R. 1528, 109th Cong. (2005) (congressional bill that sought to “fix” Booker via statutory
mandatory minimums).
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rulemakers necessary for improving any sentencing system. And
they inform litigants, the Sentencing Commission, Congress, and the
public about how the law is being applied, which is essential if the
country is to understand and have confidence in the federal
sentencing system. 290

To be clear, there is considerable debate whether reasonableness
review reins in wayward judges after Booker. 291 But we both think it is
appropriate to at least make the effort toward appellate reasonableness
review. A statement of reasons for punishment below the statutory
minimum helps ensure fairness in an individual case, requiring
articulated justifications from the sentencing judge that can then be
reviewed by an appellate panel with due respect for the trial court’s factfinding abilities. Likewise, such statements offer a potential basis for
comparing those cases within the safety valve’s ambit and thus provide
some degree of consistency in punishment, as well as generating
material for scrutiny by non-litigants, whether they are lawmakers,
sentencing commissioners, or the general public. It thus responds to
concerns of proportionality and equality through an intra-branch check
on sentencing courts.
The expanded safety valve still maintains sufficient incentives for
defendants to cooperate with authorities—specifically incorporating a
degree of deference to representations by government—while at the
same time preventing the worst cases of trial tax and other problems
related to strategic deployment of mandatory minimums. As before,
there remains only one guaranteed way for the defense to avoid a
mandatory sentence: a government motion that the defendant provided
substantial assistance through his full disclosure and cooperation. 292
When adversarialism has outrun its ability to do justice, however, in
cases of manifestly unfair sentences, the new safety valve would allow a
district court to impose punishment below the mandatory minimum.
This serves the constitutional roles of the prosecutor and judge,
reaffirming the exclusive prosecutorial authority to charge and whatever
leverage it provides, while also ensuring that law enforcement officials
cannot unilaterally bind the hands of the judiciary in the exercise of its
own core functions.
The new provision might even foster greater accuracy and
transparency throughout the criminal justice system, which can only
increase the chances for proportionality and equality in sentencing. For
290
291

Post-Booker World, supra note 253, at 18; see also Luna, Gridland, supra note 29.
See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas et al., Policing Politics at Sentencing, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1371,
1384-85 (2009); Michael M. O’Hear, Explaining Sentences, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 459, 471-85
(2009); see also United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1173 (10th Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J.,
concurring) (analogizing reasonableness review to Boy Scout “snipe hunts”—searches for elusive
and non-existent creatures).
292 See supra note 72.
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instance, Stephen Schulhofer has argued that mandatory minimums are
not mandatory at all, but instead discretionary sentencing laws
susceptible to the haphazard and even perverse charging and plea
bargaining decisions of federal prosecutors. 293 These often dispositive
decisions are made in a largely opaque process with almost no external
oversight. 294 As mentioned earlier, mandatory minimums can also
create an incentive to manipulate the facts in order to achieve particular
results, where the actors ignore evidence to avoid triggering a statutory
minimum. 295 The laws may even have a backlash effect, making
community members less likely to report suspicious behavior and
cooperate with law enforcement out of concern that their neighbors
(especially youth involved in the drug trade) may receive draconian
punishment. 296
Moreover, mandatory minimums may undermine the principal
benefit of transparency and truth: accurate outcomes. In an important
study, Ronald Wright describes how the accumulation of power by
federal prosecutors through severe sentencing laws has resulted in a
dramatic shift from trials to plea bargains and the near extinction of
acquittals. 297 As a result, some defendants who might have been
acquitted at trial are now convicted by plea bargaining, which
diminishes the chances of discovering the truth through the trial process
and, in exceptional cases, may increase the possibility of wrongful
convictions. 298 Although Professor Wright’s study focused on the preBooker mandatory guidelines, his critique applies with equal force to
statutory minimums. In fact, recent cases have demonstrated how
mandatory minimums can even generate fabricated testimony and
wrongful convictions in extreme situations. 299
The travesty of false testimony and convicted innocents needs no
discussion here. But other machinations, such as the process of “fact
bargaining,” may still appear reasonable by allowing participants to
avoid excessive sentences in difficult cases. Regardless of benign
intent, however, the distortive effect of mandatory minimums on
transparency and truth can only undercut the legitimacy of the criminal
293
294
295
296

See Schulhofer Testimony, supra note 37.
See id. at 5.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
See Schulhofer Testimony, supra note 37, at 16-18; see also Steinback Testimony, supra
note 66.
297 See Wright, supra note 120.
298 See id. at 150-54; see also Rachel Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58
STAN. L. REV. 989, 1034 (2006); Brown, Decline of Defense Counsel, supra note 115, at 159899.
299 See, e.g., Nachmanoff Testimony, supra note 37, at 13-14; see also Wright, supra note
120, at 153. It must be noted, however, that one of us (Cassell) has expressed some doubts about
the causes and extent of wrongful convictions in the United States. See, e.g., Cassell, The Guilty
and the “Innocent,” supra note 28; Markman & Cassell, supra note 28.
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justice system and its actors. The moral authority of criminal law
depends on the perception of both substantive and procedural justice,
and a system that allows, if not requires, duplicity tends to breed
contempt for the law. 300 A legitimate, properly functioning criminal
justice system would not tolerate such deception and instead would
demand that the case facts be true, not from some kind omniscient
perspective, but as best as humans can discern. This is not something
that results from an outcome-based, largely concealed process that
simply maintains a sufficient degree of truthiness in sentencing. 301
For these reasons, it is hoped that the new safety valve would
diminish, if not eliminate, whatever motivation exists to massage the
factual predicates of mandatory punishment. Judges will be able to
invoke the provision even if a firearm was found in the defendant’s
home, for example, meaning that no one has to “swallow the gun.” 302
The existence of some factor or another 303 simply does not preclude
application of the safety valve, and as a result, participants need not
evade the truth to achieve a fair sentence. The new safety valve may
also help prevent at least some of these injustices by allowing a
defendant to avoid an excessive mandatory sentence by providing
truthful information, even if it does not assist law enforcement in
convicting others.
Moreover, proper usage might assuage any public backlash from
the perceived injustices under mandatory minimums. Defendants are
not the only ones concerned about proportionality and equality in
sentencing; as suggested, the specter of excessive punishment may
render community members less likely to assist law enforcement. In
turn, when victims of actual violence notice that their assailants receive
shorter terms than imposed on non-violent offenders via mandatory
minimums, the message received is that their pain and suffering is less
important than abstract governmental objectives, like winning the “war
on drugs.” 304 Over the long haul, lay citizens may refuse to cooperate
with prosecutors and conscientious jurors may engage in nullification,
300 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also
Luna, Transparent Policing, supra note 29, at 1154-65.
301 See Kelly Heyboer, In All Truthiness, STAR-LEDGER (NEW JERSEY), Dec. 31, 2006
(defining truthiness, coined by Stephen Colbert, as “truth that comes from the gut, not books” or
the “quality of preferring concepts or facts one wishes to be true, rather than concepts or facts
known to be true”). As one federal judge noted several years ago, “Facts are like flint—whether a
defendant pleads or goes to trial, the facts should theoretically remain the same.” Berthoff v.
United States, 140 F. Supp. 2d 50, 63 n.24 (D. Mass. 2001).
302 See, e.g., United States v. Mercer, 472 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1323 (D. Utah. 2007); David M.
Zlotnick, Shouting into the Wind: District Court Judges and Federal Sentencing Policy, 9 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 645, 674-75 (2004); Wallace, supra note 37, at 161.
303 To reiterate, the Proposed Safety Valve excludes crimes that cause death or serious bodily
injury, which, as discussed above, would likely foreclose any legitimate argument about a term of
imprisonment being excessive.
304 See United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1251 (D. Utah 2004).
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not because they believe the defendant to be innocent or the allegations
unproven, but out of fear that an unjust sentence will necessarily
ensue. 305 Used appropriately, however, the safety valve may prevent
the precise type of excessive sentences that raise witness and juror
anxieties and confound victims of violence.
The new provision may also inhibit troubling disparities in
punishment. Under our proposal, a court may consider “the sentences
imposed on other offenders under the sentencing guidelines,” which
could lead to a pair of considerations. First, the court might bear in
mind the sentences (if any) received by an offender’s cohorts and, in
appropriate cases, reduce a mandatory minimum-based punishment gap
that is unrelated to differential culpability among offenders. Second, a
judge could consider whether mandatory minimums would have been
employed by another U.S. Attorney’s Office and, if so, the number of
counts that would have been brought.306
Likewise, the proposal allows for inter-jurisdictional
comparisons—“the sentences imposed for commission of the
defendant’s offense or offenses in other jurisdictions”—with a judge
able to consider the expected punishment had the defendant been
prosecuted in state court. 307 This factor thereby incorporates federalstate disparities into a court’s sentencing evaluation, hopefully
stemming the possibility of abusive forum shopping. Both factors could
foster real equality in sentencing, ensuring that punishment does not
vacillate wildly among districts and circuits, with the inter-jurisdictional
comparison also serving the constitutional principle of federalism.
“Under our federal system, the States possess primary authority for
defining and enforcing the criminal law,” the Supreme Court opined in
1995. 308 “When Congress criminalizes conduct already denounced as
criminal by the States, it effects a change in the sensitive relation
between federal and state criminal jurisdiction.” 309
The proper
application of the safety valve can help address issues of federalism
raised by the exploitation of federal mandatory minimums.
In fact, we believe that the new provision supports another
fundamental principle of American constitutional law: the separation of
powers. The concern here is not the creation of a “new Branch,” 310 as

305
306

See id. at 1252.
See, e.g., Nachmanoff Testimony, supra note 37, at 6 (providing illustration); Angelos, 345
F. Supp. 2d at 1252-54 (discussing inconsistent prosecutorial policies regarding § 924(c) in
various judicial districts).
307 For an example of such a comparison, see Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1259.
308 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995).
309 Id.; see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 426, 428 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) (noting that
federal lawmakers have “no general right to punish murder committed within any of the states”
and “cannot punish felonies generally”).
310 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Justice Scalia warned in his Mistretta dissent, given that mandatory
minimums were duly enacted by Congress. Instead, the present
problem implicates the independent role of judges in sentencing and the
effective transfer of that power to the executive branch. 311 Sentencing
is a quintessential, historically recognized judicial function, with a judge
imposing punishment on another human in response to the commission
of a crime and its aftermath. 312 There is “wisdom, even the necessity,
of sentencing procedures that take into account individual
circumstances,” 313 and draw upon the court’s familiarity with the case
and “face-to-face contact with the defendants, their families, and their
victims.” 314
With mandatory minimums, prosecutors effectively exercise
judicial power, as the ultimate sentences inevitably follow from their
charging decisions. Expressing a view held by many jurists, Justice
Kennedy described as “misguided” the “transfer of sentencing
discretion from a judge to an Assistant U.S. Attorney, often not much
older than the defendant.”
Often these attorneys try in good faith to be fair in the exercise of
discretion. The policy, nonetheless, gives the decision to an assistant
prosecutor not trained in the exercise of discretion and takes
discretion from the trial judge. The trial judge is the one actor in the
system most experienced with exercising discretion in a transparent,
open, and reasoned way. Most of the sentencing discretion should be
with the judge, not the prosecutors. 315

No doubt, sentencing involves various actors beyond the judge—
the legislature establishes boundaries of punishment, the prosecution
brings the specific charges, and the jury adjudicates guilt. But there is
something fundamental in the trial judge’s imposition of a sentence, a
duty that should not be converted into a ministerial deed. The proposed
general safety valve recognizes the overlapping roles in America’s
tripartite system, while at the same time respecting the vital, analytically
separate role of the judge at sentencing.

311
312

See, e.g., Miller, Domination, supra note 179.
See, e.g., United States v. Sidhom, 144 F. Supp. 2d 41, 41 (D. Mass 2001) (“In the long
tradition of the common law, it was the judge, the neutral arbiter, who possessed the authority to
impose sentences which he deemed just within broad perimeters established by the legislature.”).
313 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996).
314 United States v. Dyck, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1019 (D.N.D. 2003).
315 Kennedy Speech, supra note 1.
Thus, the government, not only has the authority to prosecute crime and to
decide the nature of the criminal charge to be preferred, but now has the
power to determine the severity of the punishment. As a result, courts are
required to react passively as automatons and to impose a sentence which
the judge may personally deem unjust.
Sidhom, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 41.
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Most importantly, we believe that the proposal would be politically
viable. The legislative branch would maintain supremacy, with
Congress’s mandatory minimums still on the books and the procedural
escape mechanism shaped and adopted by lawmakers themselves.
Prosecutors would still be free to bring charges carrying mandatory
minimums, and their views remain critical under our proposal. But
should a mandatory sentence prove excessive, the judiciary has the
leeway to impose a more proportionate term of imprisonment, so long
as it is based in sound legal reasoning.
Consider once again the Angelos case. At trial, the defendant was
found guilty on sixteen counts, including three charges under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c). The latter gun charges carried a mandatory minimum of 55
years imprisonment, and the other thirteen counts could have added
another 78-97 months to the sentence—for a grand total of at least 61½
years. Ultimately, however, the district court “only” imposed the 55year term pursuant to the mandatory minimums. 316 In the absence of
the § 924(c) counts, taking into consideration all crimes at issue, the
guidelines would call for a prison term of no more than 10 years. 317
The basic safety valve requirement is thus met, with the guidelines
sentence some 45 years less than required by the relevant mandatory
minimum. 318 Moreover, Angelos’s conduct did not result in death or
serious bodily injury to any person, 319 and we can presume that had the
safety valve been available, the defendant would have attempted to
provide law enforcement with any information he had relating to the
crimes in question. 320
Moving on to the safety valve’s second step, it is clear that not all
facts or factors would support a below-mandatory minimum sentence.
The jury found that Angelos possessed firearms in connection with his
marijuana dealing, 321 and for the sake of argument, let’s assume that the
government would oppose the reduction and would make
representations unfavorable to the defendant’s case. 322 On the other
316
317

United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1260-61 (D. Utah 2004).
See supra note 283. The guidelines themselves have a provision that conforms sentences
to any mandatory minimums. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.2(a) (2010)
(“Where the statutorily authorized maximum sentence is less than the minimum of the applicable
guideline range, the statutorily authorized maximum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.”).
For purposes of this article, we ignore this conforming provision and assume that it would be
amended or eliminated consistent with our proposed reforms.
318 Proposed Safety Valve, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1), supra note 277.
319 Id. § 3553(f)(1)(A).
320 Id. § 3553(f)(1)(B); see Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1258 (“Mr. Angelos did not engage in
force or violence, or threats of force or violence, in furtherance of or in connection with the
offenses for which he has been convicted. No offense involved injury to any person or the threat
of injury to any person.”); id. at 1232 (noting Angelos’s attempt to reopen plea negotiations).
321 See Proposed Safety Valve, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2)(C), supra note 277.
322 For instance, one might expect that the government would claim that defendant Angelos
should be classified as an “organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” in a continuing criminal
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hand, Angelos was a first-time offender under federal law, 323 and he did
not use violence or credible threats of violence during the commission
of these crimes. 324 In addition, a comparative analysis points toward the
prescribed mandatory sentence being excessive. 325
No other
jurisdiction would have imposed a 55-year sentence for the crimes in
this case, and had the defendant been charged in local state court, he
might have served between 5 to 7 years imprisonment and likely would
have been paroled after 2 to 3 years. 326 Moreover, Angelos and the
government’s informant allegedly committed virtually identical acts
(i.e., selling drugs and possessing firearms). But while Angelos
received a 55-year mandatory federal sentence, state charges against the
informant were dismissed in favor of federal prosecution, which was
never commenced.
Worse yet, Angelos’s sentence is longer than the punishment
imposed on far more serious federal offenses and offenders. His
punishment exceeds the federal sentence for, among others, an aircraft
hijacker, a second-degree murderer, a kidnapper, a child rapist, and a
spy who gathers top-secret information. 327 “Indeed, Angelos will
receive a far longer sentence than those imposed for three aircraft
hijackings, three second-degree murders, three kidnappings, and three
rapes.” 328 Ironically, the 55-year sentence for possessing a firearm
three times in connection with minor marijuana offenses is more than
twice the federal sentence for a kingpin of a major drug trafficking ring
in which a death results, and more than four times the sentence for a
marijuana dealer who shoots an innocent person during a drug
transaction. Even the habitual offender who receives a “life sentence”
under the federal three-strikes provision could serve a shorter term than
Angelos. 329
Pursuant to the new safety valve’s catch-all provision, a sentencing
judge may consider other, non-enumerated factors which bear on the
goals of punishment. 330 For instance, the jury in Angelos was asked
what it believed to be an appropriate sentence in this case, with the
jurors recommending a median sentence of 15 years and a mean of
about 18 years. 331 This information is not only highly relevant—given
that the jurors had heard the entire trial and had the opportunity to
enterprise. See id. at § 3553(f)(2)(D). Moreover, an appellate panel drew a less-than-favorable
picture of the defendant. See United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 751-53 (10th Cir. 2005).
323 See Proposed Safety Valve, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2)(B), supra note 277.
324 See id. § 3553(f)(2)(C).
325 See id. § 3553(f)(2)(E)-(F).
326 See United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1243-48, 1258 (D. Utah 2004).
327 See id. at 1242-43, 1259.
328 See id. at 1246, 1258.
329 See id. at 1248-51.
330 Proposed Safety Valve, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2)(G), supra note 277.
331 See Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1242; see also infra notes 350-351 and accompanying text.
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assess each witness and piece of evidence—it also serves as a reflection
of what average citizens would deem to be an appropriate outcome and,
we believe, supports the Supreme Court’s recent concerns about the
right to trial by jury. 332
Whatever facts and factors are relied upon by a sentencing judge,
the proposal would require the court to explain with precision why the
safety valve is properly employed in the case at bar, setting forth a
written statement for review in appellate proceedings. 333 It would be
expected that a judge would have to produce a coherent, persuasive
rationale for imposing a sentence below the otherwise binding 55-year
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment in Angelos. In other words,
the safety valve is not to be summoned frivolously.
In this way, the proposal would avert mandatory minimum
sentences only in those situations where they produce the most
manifestly unjust results, with the safety valve triggered when the
mandatory minimums prescribe sentences higher than the applicable
sentencing guidelines. As a statistical matter, the safety valve might be
relevant to a sizable percentage of cases in which mandatory minimums
applied. In fiscal year 2008, the mandatory minimum sentence was
higher than the guidelines range in 41.3% of all cases (8292 of
20,127). 334 Opponents of mandatory minimums may argue that our
formulation does not go far enough, however, leaving long, inescapable
sentences in place. But we again note that the proposal can be viewed
as an initial measure that could lead to further reforms. In the next Part,
we will address some other changes that lawmakers might consider.
From the other side, proponents of mandatory minimums might
criticize our proposal as going too far. In particular, the revised safety
valve could allow judges to dole out lower sentences to violent
criminals, including those who have used firearms to commit crimes of
violence. While the new scheme still excludes offenders who have
caused death or serious bodily injury, it does allow those who have, for
example, displayed or even discharged a firearm to seek application of
the safety valve. In the latter cases, however, the sentencing guidelines
332 At first blush, our proposal might appear to violate the Sixth Amendment by folding in
judicial decision-making as determinative of a sentencing guidelines range. But as case law
currently stands, there is no constitutional problem with this scheme because it applies only to
lower a defendant’s sentence below what would otherwise be prescribed by a mandatory
minimum. According to Booker, the Sixth Amendment constraints apply to fact-finding “which
is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by
a plea of guilty or a jury verdict.” United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005). The
proposed safety valve has no effect on the maximum punishment and instead only allows a
sentence below the mandatory minimum, an issue that animates none of the Court’s recent
doctrine.
333 Proposed Safety Valve, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(3), supra note 277.
334 Nachmanoff Testimony, supra note 37, at 5 (recounting data from the U.S. Sentencing
Commission).
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typically provide extremely tough penalties, including specific weapons
enhancements, making a light sentence unlikely for those who brandish
or discharge firearms. 335 The proposal thus maintains significant
incentives for defendants to cooperate with prosecutors and gain a
government motion for a sentence below the guidelines. Moreover, the
safety valve still provides the assurance of a sentencing floor in cases
where a mandatory minimum would otherwise apply. 336
B.

Authority for the Sentencing Commission to Decouple the
Guidelines from the Mandatory Minimums

The proposal to use the guidelines as a mechanism for flagging
cases of unjustified mandatory minimum sentences is vulnerable to
another attack. Critics of our proposal might note that the guidelines
themselves are often pegged to the mandatory minimums. It is no
accident that the basic guidelines range for drug possession often turns
out to be about the same sentence prescribed by a mandatory drug
provision. 337 The underlying motivation is easy to understand: The
Commission is a creature of the political branches, 338 and rather than
cross swords with federal lawmakers, it has long relied upon (or felt
bound by) congressional mandatory minimums as starting points for
setting the guidelines. 339
This is not because the Commission
necessarily agreed that a prescribed statutory sentence was appropriate;

335 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A2.2(b)(2) (2010) (firearms
enhancements to aggravated assault guideline); see also id. § 5K2.6 (authorizing upward
departure for use or possession of a weapon or dangerous instrumentality in the commission of an
offense). If the penalties for violent crimes are for some reason generally too low, the better
approach—even from a purely crime control perspective—is to raise the sentencing guidelines for
violent crimes rather than rely upon the happenstance of a mandatory minimum.
336 The guidelines also provide specific authorization for various departures in limited
circumstances, such as diminished capacity, see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
5K2.13, or voluntary disclosure of the offense, see id. § 5K2.16. A sentence below the otherwise
applicable guidelines range, due to one of these specifically identified departures, would likewise
be a guidelines sentence.
337 Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2006), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
2D1.1(c)(7). The Commission sometimes sets its guidelines just slightly above a mandatory
minimum sentence, apparently so that there can be no suggestion that it is encouraging judges to
go below a statutory minimum. See, e.g., Saltzburg Testimony, supra note 37, at 9.
338 See generally Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A
Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1347 (2005).
339 See, e.g., Beryl A. Howell, Comm’r, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Statement at Public
Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission (July 9, 2009), at 138 (transcript available at
http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20090709/Public_Hearing_Transcript.pdf) (“[G]enerally the
Commission has opted to link guideline offense levels to the mandatory minimums . . . .”);
Nachmanoff Testimony, supra note 37, at 5; see also Hatch, supra note 4, at 194-95; Kimbrough
v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109-10 (2007) (arguing that the Commission did not use its
empirical data and national experience in crafting the crack cocaine guidelines).
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instead, it appears the Commission recognized that the statutory
mandatory minimum will trump anything in the guidelines. 340
Given that the severity of the guidelines is often tied to the severity
of mandatory minimums, our suggested mechanism for identifying
unjust punishment will sometimes be flawed. For instance, a drug
dealer may be subject to a guidelines sentence at or above a mandatory
term set by statute, despite the fact that the Commission might have set
a lower sentencing range absent the skewing effect of the mandatory
minimums. The guidelines as they exist today will never flag such a
sentence as too severe.
The solution to this problem is to give the Commission license to
use its own independent judgment about sentencing guidelines without
requiring it to parrot every mandatory minimum penalty. Just as critics
of mandatory minimums have raised the cry “Let Judges Be Judges,”
one could argue that it is time to “Let Commissioners Be
Commissioners” (admittedly, a less catchy phrase). The Sentencing
Commission is supposed to be the expert body designed to review
sentencing policy, and as mentioned in the introduction, Congress itself
has called on the Commission to review thoroughly the array of federal
mandatory minimums. 341
In view of this explicit invitation from Congress, we would urge
the Commission to consider ways to decouple the guidelines from
arbitrary punishments specified in the mandatory minimum sentencing
statutes. While the Commission could perhaps do this on its own
initiative, federal lawmakers could provide a firmer foundation for the
undertaking. In particular, Congress should adopt legislation that
invites the Commission to consider the mandatory minimum penalties
provided by statute but not necessarily rig the guidelines to these
penalties. One way of drafting such legislation would be to amend the
statute spelling out the duties of the Commission as follows:
28 U.S.C. § 994. Duties of the Commission
(a) The Commission, by affirmative vote of at least four members
of the Commission, and pursuant to its rules and regulations and
giving due consideration to consistent with all pertinent provisions
of any Federal statute shall promulgate and distribute to all courts
of the United States and to the United States Probation System—

340 At times, the Commissioners have even encouraged Congress to reform certain troubling
laws. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (noting the Commission’s attempts to persuade
lawmakers to eliminate the crack/powder sentencing differentials).
341 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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(1) guidelines, as described in this section, for use of a
sentencing court in determining the sentence to be imposed in a
criminal case . . . .
...
(b)(1) The Commission, in the guidelines promulgated pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), shall, for each category of offense
involving each category of defendant, establish a sentencing
range that gives due consideration to is consistent with all
pertinent provisions of title 18, United States Code.
It is debatable whether the current law directing that the guidelines
be “consistent with” all federal statutes necessarily requires the
Commission to track every jot and jiggle of mandatory minimum
sentences. As a practical matter, the guidelines today do not always
track mandatory minimums. 342 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
squarely held that the guidelines are not required to follow slavishly
every contour of a mandatory minimum. 343 Nonetheless, the current
statutory language can be read by the Commission as encouraging it to
defer to sentences prescribed by mandatory minimums even where its
expert opinion suggests otherwise. Our proposed changes would make
clear that Congress wants the Commission to exercise its own judgment
on appropriate sentencing policy and to construct guidelines that take
advantage of the Commission’s expertise.
Some readers may wonder why Congress would want to invite the
Commission to have its guidelines deviate from other statutes enacted
by Congress. This straightforward inquiry has two straightforward
answers. First, Congress itself appears to harbor doubts about the
panoply of federal mandatory minimums, as demonstrated by the new
crack cocaine law, the statements of some officials, and the order to the
Commission to investigate and propose alternatives to these schemes.
The simplest way to address those misgivings, we believe, is to
empower the Commission to set generally applicable guidelines as it
sees fit and then allow judges to depart downward from a demonstrably
excessive mandatory sentence to the lower boundary set by the
guidelines. Second, Congress will always retain the last word on
federal sentencing policy.
No guideline promulgated by the
Commission can take effect until a six-month review period elapses,
during which Congress is free to intervene. 344 Thus, if the Commission
342
343

See, e.g., supra notes 259-263, 334 and accompanying text.
See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 106 (noting that various crack/powder cocaine sentencing
guidelines do not follow the 100:1 ratio established in mandatory minimum sentences).
344 28 U.S.C. § 944(p) (2006). To be clear, Congress has rarely rejected proposed guidelines.
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ventures too far down paths that Congress did not approve, lawmakers
could block the changes from taking effect.
V. FURTHER REFORMS
The proposed reform does not involve any direct congressional
repeal of a mandatory minimum sentence. Instead, it suggests small
steps based on the idea of political minimalism, informed by principles
of broad consensus, drawing upon readily available vehicles and
materials, and operationalized in a manner that is narrowly tailored to
prevent miscarriages of justice. The proposal is thereby limited to
changes that could achieve wide agreement in Congress among both
conservatives and liberals, Republicans and Democrats. And because
the reform is consistent with commonly held values like proportionality,
providing rhetorical cover for proponents, it has a better chance of
survival in what has become an increasingly acrimonious legislative
process.
Moreover, we hope that the adoption of a minimalist reform could
prod other changes as well. As discussed above, the norm of harsh
punishment has proven to be sticky. But prior resistance to change may
belie its present fragility, with various indicators suggesting that
sentencing reform may be welcome among the public as well as feasible
to elected officials. 345 With the passage of the new crack cocaine law, it
could be imagined that another relatively modest revision may further
nudge lawmakers to a tipping point—which, when reached, might
unleash a powerful transformation and stir other, possibly bigger
reforms as more and more officials move toward a new norm of
sentencing. Of course, something in the political atmosphere may still
encourage the stock response to sentencing reform efforts, with
opportunists ready to label proponents as soft on crime, anti-law
enforcement, insufficiently attentive to crime victims, etc. But by
crafting the next step pursuant to political minimalism, the potential
blowback may be minimized as well.
Various other proposals have been contemplated by federal
officials. Reform advocates have called for retroactive application of
the crack cocaine law to those already serving federal sentences, for
instance, and the law itself directs the Sentencing Commission to study
the effectiveness of drug courts as an alternative to incarceration. 346 In
concluding this Article, therefore, we wanted to mention a few other

345
346

See, e.g., Beale, Still Tough on Crime?, supra note 95, at 422-23.
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 9, 124 Stat. 2372, 2374-75 (to be
codified at 28 U.S.C § 994).

LUNA.CASSELL.32-1

78

9/13/2010 12:25:07 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:1

changes to the federal system that could build upon successful
minimalist reform and might attract bipartisan consensus.
One possibility would be to have juries participate in the
determination of whether a mandatory minimum sentence is excessive.
As an institution, the jury occupies a position of great historical and
constitutional significance in America, serving as a check and balance
on government and offering a direct means for citizen participation and
community representation. 347 Moreover, it may provide a mechanism
for identifying cases of unjust punishment and lend credibility to federal
sentencing. Public support is a necessary component of a legitimate
criminal justice system, but as mentioned, there are signs that the
populous has grown disenchanted with mandatory minimums. 348
We recognize that measuring public opinion can be a fickle and
uncertain project. Some polls may not represent a fair cross-section of
the relevant community, while the nature of questions asked and the
level of factual detail provided can easily skew results. These
objections may disappear, however, if the trial court presents a specific
query to a jury that has heard all of the evidence in the case at hand.
The issue is how long should this specific defendant be imprisoned, and
the decision-maker is constitutionally required to be “a fair crosssection of the community.” 349
Again, the Angelos case provides an illustration of how to
implement this reform. To reiterate, after the defendant was convicted,
the judge provided the jury with “relevant information about Mr.
Angelos’s limited criminal history, described the abolition of parole in
the federal system, and asked the jurors what they believed was the
appropriate penalty for Mr. Angelos.” 350
None of the jurors
recommended a term close to the effective life-sentence required by the
mandatory minimums—a fact the judge cited in suggesting that the
mandatory sentence was unjust. Interestingly, the government objected
to the entire endeavor. The protest, however, perhaps intimates
uneasiness about the justice of mandatory sentences rather than the
insight of juries. As recounted in the Angelos opinion:
At oral argument, the court asked the government what it thought
about the jurors’ recommendations and whether it was appropriate to
impose a sentence so much higher than what the jurors thought
appropriate. The government’s response was quite curious: “Judge,
we don’t know if that jury is a random representative sample of the
citizens of the United States. . . .” Of course, the whole point of the
elaborate jury selection procedures used in this case was to assure
347
348
349

See, e.g., Erik Luna, The Katz Jury, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 839 (2008).
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523 (2004) (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
530 (1975)).
350 United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1242 (D. Utah 2004).
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that the jury was, indeed, such a fair cross section of the population
so that the verdict would be accepted with confidence. It is hard to
understand why the government would be willing to accept the
decision of the jury as to the guilt of the defendant but not as to the
length of sentence that might be imposed. 351

Judge James Gwin and other federal judges in the Midwest
recently repeated the Angelos experiment in jury polling on a larger
scale. 352 In twenty-two jury trials resulting in conviction, the district
court gave the jurors information about the defendant’s criminal history
and asked them to recommend a term of imprisonment for the
defendant. 353 In almost every case, the jury advised a prison term
substantially lower than the sentencing guidelines. Moreover, in every
case in which a sentencing judge added a mandatory minimum onto the
guidelines sentence, the jury recommended a lower sentence than was
otherwise called for. 354
We foresee no serious objection to a judge receiving jury input
when fixing punishment within a lawful range. Federal law specifically
provides that a judge can receive almost unlimited information when
determining a proper sentence. 355 In fact, the idea of jury sentencing
has garnered (mostly) positive scholarly attention in recent years,
largely due to the Supreme Court’s budding Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence. 356 During the half-year interregnum between Blakely v.
Washington, 357 which struck down a state sentencing guidelines
scheme, and its federal mirror-image in Booker, at least a few federal
courts utilized jury sentencing pursuant to case-specific deliberation
forms. 358 In addition, several states incorporate jurors in punishment

351
352
353
354

Id.
Gwin, supra note 241.
Id. at 186-88 (describing survey scope and methods).
See id. at 196-200 tbl.3 (comparing guideline/statutory sentences with jury
recommendations).
355 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.4 (2010)
(“In determining the sentence to impose within the guideline range, or whether a departure from
the guidelines is warranted, the court may consider, without limitation, any information
concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited
by law.”).
356 See, e.g., Betrall L. Ross II, Reconciling the Booker Conflict: A Substantive Sixth
Amendment in a Real Offense Sentencing System, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 725,
771-78 (2006); Nancy J. King & Roosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A
Three State Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885 (2004); Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury
Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951 (2003); Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice,
89 VA. L. REV. 311 (2003); Adriaan Laani, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose
Time Has Come (Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 1775 (1999).
357 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
358 See, e.g., Pamela Manson, Sentencing Rules Face High Scrutiny in Wake of Ruling, SALT
LAKE TRIB., July 19, 2004, at A1 (describing jury sentencing practice of U.S. District Court
Judge Dale Kimball).
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decision-making to some extent or another, practices which presumably
could offer a useful source of information and experiences. 359
The limited proposal here would be to use a jury as an additional
means for flagging those cases in which a mandatory minimum
sentence would produce an unjust prison term. Legislation could be
crafted requiring this process only in cases where a defendant was
convicted of crimes carrying mandatory prison terms of more than, say,
ten years. In such situations, the judge would provide the defendant’s
criminal history and other relevant information to the jury, which would
then deliberate and recommend a sentence to the court. If that
recommendation were less than the mandatory minimum, the judge
would then be authorized (but not required) to impose a sentence below
the mandatory term.
The proposal might limit the judge’s discretion in such cases by,
for instance, requiring that any sentence does not fall below the mean or
median prison term recommended by the jury. Nonetheless, the
approach would ensure that judges were not obligated to impose lengthy
mandatory prison terms far in excess of what the public believes is fair.
It is one thing to sentence someone to prison for decades when that is
the type of punishment deemed appropriate by the general public, but it
is another thing to do so when the affected community (as represented
by a jury) supports a far shorter sentence. This proposal would help
identify such extreme cases and permit judges to avoid miscarriages of
justice.
Other reforms might go beyond the ambit of our safety valve
proposal. For instance, federal lawmakers might reconsider the
“stacking” of mandatory minimum sentences pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
924(c). As illustrated by the Angelos case, 360 a defendant can rack up
decades of prison time by possessing a gun in several separate criminal
offenses, even where those offenses are all part of the same episode.
This problem can be traced to the Supreme Court’s decision in Deal v.
United States, 361 which considered whether the increased penalties for
“second or subsequent” convictions under § 924(c) allowed multiple
stacked penalties when the convictions were all part of the same
proceeding.
In essence, the issue was whether Congress intended § 924(c) to be
a true recidivist statute or one that increased penalties for a singleepisode offender. Most of the lower courts had not applied the
additional punishment when the second conviction was just another §

359
360
361

See, e.g., King & Noble, supra note 356.
See supra notes 259-263 and accompanying text.
508 U.S. 129 (1993).
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924(c) count in an indictment. 362 But the Supreme Court construed the
“plain meaning” of the statute far more broadly, holding that a “second
or subsequent” conviction could arise from a single prosecution. 363 A
dissenting opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens argued that
Congress had intended the provision to apply “to defendants who,
having once been convicted under § 924(c), failed to learn their lessons
from the initial punishment and committed a repeat offense.”364
This Article does not delve into the merits of the Court’s
jurisprudence on legislative intent and the conclusion it produced in
Deal based on the ostensible plain meaning of the statute. Instead, our
limited point here is that the Supreme Court’s interpretation has
produced a fearsome mandatory minimum statute that is not a true
recidivist law. An offender can receive a lifetime’s worth of
punishment for just a few days of criminal activity. This stacking
aspect cannot be justified on grounds that it is sending a message to
recidivists who did not learn a lesson, given that a defendant will not
have been convicted and imprisoned in the time between § 924(c)
violations. 365 For these and other reasons, § 924(c) should be amended
to be a true recidivist law, with Congress overturning Deal to make the
statute conform to the interpretation of the dissenters. If an offender
commits a firearms offense, goes to prison for five years, and then
commits a second or subsequent offense after his release, he would be
eligible for a lengthy prison term—but not until then.
Another possible reform would consider bringing back parole for
prisoners serving extremely long prison terms, particularly where those
terms resulted from mandatory minimum sentences. 366 Like our other
proposals, this would not involve a direct attack on mandatory
minimums. Instead, it would call for the re-energizing of the U.S.
Parole Commission, which currently has the limited authority to review
sentences for some prisoners—namely, those who committed their
offenses before November 1, 1987. 367 After review, the Parole
Commission has the power to grant or deny parole to these prisoners.
362 See, e.g., United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1315-17 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 983 (1988).
363 Deal, 508 U.S. at 132-34. In Deal, the defendant was convicted of committing six
different bank robberies on six different dates, each time using a gun. He was sentenced to five
years for the first § 924(c) charge, and twenty years for each of the other five § 924(c) charges,
for a total of 105 years. Id. at 131.
364 Id. at 146-47 (Steven, J., dissenting).
365 Cf. supra note 101 and accompany text (quoting the congressional sponsor’s rationale for §
924(c)).
366 Such a provision might help deal with some of the issues of retroactive application of
sentencing reforms.
367 This was the effective date of the sentencing guidelines. A full listing of the Parole
Commission’s various responsibilities is found on its website, http://www.justice.gov/uspc (last
visited Aug. 31, 2010).
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Congress could easily provide it broader authority to evaluate current
prison sentences and consider whether it makes sense to continue to
incarcerate long-serving inmates.
When it passed the federal sentencing guidelines, Congress
abolished parole in order to ensure that offenders served a set amount of
prison time. The broader crusade for “truth in sentencing” was intended
to deter potential offenders and guarantee the public that a criminal
would not receive a mere slap-on-the-wrist penalty. 368 Regardless of
whether these goals were in any way served by the guidelines regime, at
some point the diminishing returns of punishment are outweighed by
the concrete (and substantial) costs of incarcerating prisoners. Precisely
where that point lies is, no doubt, a subject of debate. But we think that
there might be a political consensus that after a prisoner has been
incarcerated for a significant amount of time—at least 15 years in
prison, for example—the Parole Commission could investigate whether
conditional release should be granted. 369
It is also worth noting that federal law already contains a
“compassionate release” provision, authorizing the Bureau of Prisons to
make a motion to the district court for the release of a prisoner who is at
least seventy years old and has served at least thirty years in prison, or
for other “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” 370 The Bureau of
Prisons has interpreted this authority very narrowly, effectively limiting
release to those with terminal illnesses or severely debilitating and
irreversible conditions. 371
Perhaps Congress should expand this
authority to include additional circumstances where the Bureau could
use parole or other forms of discretionary release to discharge prisoners
who have already served extensive sentences. 372
The above suggestions go beyond a strictly delimited reform
animated by political minimalism. But as mentioned, the success of a
small step might inspire bigger moves. Moreover, the ideological
diversity of those who have called for a reexamination of sentencing
policy carries the possibility that the relevant norm entrepreneur could
have unassailable law-and-order credentials. Like the adage that “only
Nixon could go to China,” maybe a well-respected, politically
impervious legislator or other opinion leader could help rouse support
for meaningful change in sentencing. Topics for discussion might
include not only the uses and limits of mandatory minimums but also,
368
369
370
371
372

See S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3222-32.
See Miller, Domination, supra note 179, at 1268 n.201 (advancing a variant of this idea).
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) (2006).
See Williams v. Van Buren, 117 F. App’x 985, 986 (5th Cir. 2004).
Scholars have suggested various other reforms to mandatory minimums, short of explicit
repeal, that deserve consideration by Congress. See, e.g., Schulhofer Testimony, supra note 37,
at 26-29 (discussing reforms to co-conspirator and accomplice liability and adjustments to
guidelines ranges).
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for instance: the proper allocation of sentencing power among the three
branches of government; the ethical and practical issues raised by plea
bargaining, either as an exception to adjudication or as the rule; the
empirical and normative significance of criminal history and the
efficacy of recidivist schemes; and the moral value of a defendant’s
post-crime mea culpa. 373
CONCLUSION
Our proposal will not completely satisfy either side of the debate.
Critics of mandatory minimums can argue that it simply trades a set of
statutory mandatory minimums for a different set found in the
sentencing guidelines. Defenders of mandatory minimums may contend
that it shortens sentences for serious offenders, reducing the deterrent
effect of the federal criminal code. To some extent, we may be guilty as
charged on both fronts. At the same time, however, we agree with the
political adage that the most dangerous place to be is in the middle of
the road. Recognizing that Congress has historically been reluctant to
repeal mandatory minimum sentences, we have tried to craft a proposal
that proceeds from principles of consensus and focuses reform on the
most extreme situations. As a result, we believe that this proposal
might have some prospect of passage in Congress and could serve as a
useful measure toward creating a fairer federal criminal justice system.
In fact, it might inspire further sentencing reforms in both federal
and state sentencing law. The proposal offers a small but principled
move for Congress and an invitation to keep moving forward. While
our primary focus has been on the federal system, congressional action
could instigate constructive developments in the state justice systems,
which handle the bulk of crime and punishment in America. Given
current misgivings about mandatory minimums generally, thoughtful
reform in the federal system could be a catalyst for change across the
nation. Wherever such discussion leads, however, and whether or not a
tipping point is even reached, the proposed modification to the federal
mandatory minimum scheme can at least help avoid the occasional
injustice of excessive punishment without emasculating whatever
benefit mandatory minimums provide to law enforcement. It would be,
we believe, a step in the right direction.

373 See, e.g., Julian V. Roberts, The Role of Criminal Record in the Sentencing Process, 22
CRIME & JUST. 303 (1997) (discussing the relevance of a defendant’s criminal history).

